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INTRODUCTION
The executlve-adfflinistratlve branch of Montana government is an 
extremely complex arrangement* Several factors contribute to the coiih 
plexity of Montana’s administrative organization. The principal fac­
tors are, the existence of several elected executive officials in 
addition to the governor, the reliance on boards and commissions for 
administrative purposes, and the growth in number of unrelated admin­
istrative units.
It is the purpose of this thesis to describe the executive 
system and to explore and analyze the three major attempts to reorgan­
ize the system. To conduct this analysis, a model administrative plan 
has been constructed to be used as an analytical and comparative tool. 
This model plan represents a logical and integrated executive system 
based upon administrative theory and practice.
In developing a model plan for a single branch of state govern­
ment it is easy to neglect consideration of the other two branches of 
the government. Development of a model plan presupposes a commi.tment 
to reorganization. Reorganization however, is a composite procedure, 
taking into account the interrelationship of the legislative, judicial 
and executive branches. Aiqr broad attempt at reorganization of 
Montana’s state government must consider the problems present in the 
legislative and judicial branches as well as the problems in the execu­
tive branch.
This thesis is restricted to a study of Montana’s executive 
organization. It is predicated upon the basic assumption that the
i
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present executive-administrative structure in Montana is inferior to 
structures found in other states and to systems advocated by both 
students and practitioners of state government. Underlying this basic 
assumption is the writer's belief that executive authority must be comr- 
mensurate with executive responsibility. In state government the 
governor should have authority to administer the laws and he should be 
commensurably accountable to the people for that administration. 
Authority and responsibility for executive action should be centered 
in the governor.
Montana's executive branch is characterized ly the diffusion of 
executive authority and responsibility among several elected executive 
officials and among many boards and commissions. This diffusion is a 
result of the historical period during which the State of Montana 
became a political reality.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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CHAPTER I
ADMINISTRATION GROWTH AND THE REORGANIZATION MOVEMENT
At the close of the nineteenth century, the prevailing theory 
of the state executive was the offspring of Jacksonian democracy. 
President Jackson represented the frontier farmers and the new labor­
ing class. Jackson advocated the idea that the legislature represented 
the interests of the old aristocracy, while the executive was a repre­
sentative of all the people. "As Jackson fought with the Congress and 
the Supreme Court, the chief executive became the champion of the 
people in the ^es of the people."^ As a result of the Jacksonian 
image of the chief executive, a movement began in the states to 
strengthen the chief executive. The colonial fear of the governor 
began to dissipate.
Jackson's argument that long retention of officials in office 
was detrimental to good government found expression in his advocacy of 
rotation. According to Jackson, officialdom must be changed after 
each election. The states altered this concept of rotation in office 
and instituted the practice of filling state administrative offices ty 
election. If the governor was truly the representative of the entire 
electorate, officialdom could also be made responsive by allowing only
^Allan R. Richards, "The Traditions of Government in the States," 
The Fortv-Elght States; Their Tasks as Policy Makers and Administra­
tors (Harriman, New York: The American Assembly, Graduate School of
Business, Columbia University, 1955), p. 45*
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those persons receiving the mandate of the people to serve in office.^ 
This movement for the popular election of administrative officials grew 
until the usual procedure in the state was to elect a governor, lieu­
tenant governor, a secretary of state, an attorney general, and a 
treasurer. Thus, the voter was faced with the so-called long ballot, 
consisting of mauy elected executive, judicial, and administrative 
officials. As a result of this practice the dominant role of the legis­
lature declined. There was, however, no corresponding increase in the 
power of the governor. Instead, the legislature's dominance was replaced 
primarily by the voter, rather than by the chief executive.3 Supreme 
executive power was now diffused among several elected officials. Either 
as members of boards or an individuals, these officers were charged with 
the administration of state government. The role of the governor as 
the responsible officer for executing the laws and administering the 
state activities was now being played by several actors simultaneously.
In addition to multiplicity of elected executive officials,
another political phencMenon appeared in the executive branch. This
was the concept of citizen control of state administration by means of
boards and commissions rather than by appointed administrators. It
also produced a tendency toward the diffusion of executive power. As
Lipson points out in this regards
Similar problems are presented by the existence of boards and 
commissions. Prior to reorganization the states were 'cmmissioned
^Ibid.
%ork Villbern, "Administration in State Government,* The Forty- 
Eight States t Their Tasks as Policy Makers and Administrators (Harriman, 
Hew lorki The American Assembly, Graduate School of Business, Columbia 
University, 1955), p. 115.
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to death,* and the governor had inadequate power of control,4-
The main argument for the introduction of boards and commissions
as executive bodies was that a board will keep politics out of an
administrative agency. It was argued that if the governor was allowed
to select an agency or department head, administration would suffer due
to the political ties implicit in such an appointment* According to
Lipson the remedy was:
Place at the top, a board, whose members are appointed by the 
governor for long overlapping terms* The board acts as a 'buffer* 
between the governor and the executive head * . * this argument 
and the fear which prompts it, is similar to the motives of the 
long ballot advocates.^
A second argument for the board and commission form of government was 
continuity* When the membership of boards and ccsnmissions were appointed 
for long overlapping terms, it was felt that "their collective experience 
would be preserved."^ Another argument was that a group decision was 
superior to the decision of any single individual; wisdom would reign 
in a council of minds* The advocates of commission government also felt 
that a department would serve the public best if representatives of 
effected groups and sections made the decisions.
Executive power at the close of the nineteenth century was thus 
characterized by diffusion. The many elected officials executing admin­
istrative functions and making administrative policy decisions contrib­
uted to this diffusion* Employment of boards and commissions for
^Leslie Lipson, The Governor from Figure Head to Leader (Chicago, 
111,: The University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 182,
5lbid*, p* 183. 
6lbid*. p* 184*
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administrative purposes spread the executive function among still more 
Individuals. The governor was the chief executive In name only. His 
power lay primarily In the degree to which he could exercise his politi­
cal prowess.
Montana
It was In this atmosphere that the executive branch of Montana 
state government was created. When the Montana Constitutional Conven­
tion met In 1889 to draft a constitution and erect a government for the 
new state ̂ the concepts of elected administrators and diffused executive 
power were. Indeed, present. The executive branch of Montana government 
was conceived as an executive department.^ Within this department the 
executive power was to be diffused between seven elected officials: a
governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, secretary of state, 
treasurer, a superintendent of public instruction, and a state auditor, 
all of whom were to be elected by the people for four-year terms.®
The multl-headed executive concept was not the result of the 
Montana convention*s Ingenuity. It was In keeping with the prevailing 
concept of state government and the article erecting the executive 
department was drawn almost exclusively from the Colorado Constitution.9 
Dispersal of the executive power left the governor In a somewhat 
anomalous position. The adopted constitution stated that: "The supreme
"̂ Montana, Constitution. Art. 7, Sec. 2.
®ibia.
9Elbert F. Allen, Sources of the Montana State Constitution 
(unpublished paper compiled by Frank Woody. Library, Montana State 
University), p. 3.
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executive power of the state shall be vested in the governor, who shall
see that the laws are faithfully executed.
However, the members of the convention did not seriously believe
the governor would actually act in this lofty role.
Mr. Collins of Cascades I think in the first place that the office 
of Governor is more ornament than anything else. The duties are 
less than that of any other officer mentioned in this section, and 
the compensation should be in accordance with the duties performed. 
The Secretary of State, State Auditor, State Treasurer, or Superin­
tendent of Public Instruction, either one of them, do a great deal 
more work— two or three times more work and some of them ten times 
more work than the Legislative assembly will ever impose upon the 
Governor.11
This statement was made regarding a proposal to reduce the salary of the 
governor. No objection was raised to Mr, Collins* conception of the 
governor's office; it was felt that although the governor was not going 
to be burdened with work, he would have to entertain visiting officials. 
If his salary was too low, only a rich man could possibly afford the 
governorship.12
This ostensible concurrence in an inactive role for the governor 
was accompanied by several provisions further emasculating the supreme 
executive power of the governor. Notable among these was the provision 
establishing the Board of Examiners .13
iPMontana, Constitution. Art. 7, Sec. 5.
llMontana, Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention. Helena 
Montana, 1889, p. 442.
12Proceedings. pp. A42-443.
l^Note: This body is established in Article VII, Section 20 
of the Constitution as adopted. Mr. Allen was unable to discover the 
exact origin of this section (Allen, p. 4)* Oregon has a similar board 
however (Lipson, pp. 336-337).
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This board passes on all financial claims against the state. The
board consists of the governor, attorney general, and the secretary of
state. Here, the executive control over matters financial Is diffused
among two other members of the executive department.
Another example of this concept of executive power related to the
pardoning power of the governor. The Constitution provided that:
The governor shall have the power to grant pardons absolute or 
conditional . . . .
However, the section goes on to say that the governor has this power
except that:
Before granting pardons, remitting fines and forfeitures, or 
commuting punishments, the action of the governor concerning same 
shall be approved by a board, or a majority thereof, composed of 
the secretary of state, attorney general and state auditor, who 
shall be known as the board of pardons.^
Here, also the executive power was divided among the members of the 
executive department and the "supreme executive power" of the governor 
reduced accordingly.
The members of the convention erected the multiple executive.
They charged the governor with the responsibility of executing and 
administering the laws of the state, but In actuality placed the authority 
for that execution In hands of all seven members of the executive depart­
ment.
Generally, the convention delegates felt that state services 
should be administered by boards and commissions. Some boards were to 
be presided over by the elected members of the executive department.
Other boards were to be appointed by the governor. As state functions
^Constitution. Art. 7, Sec. 9»
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increased, there was a corresponding increase in the nnmber of boards 
and commissions to administer these services.
There are numerous ex officio boards upon which members of the 
executive department serve. The number of these boards has increased 
greatly as new services were added. In 1890 there were five ex officio 
boards ; in 1953 there were fourteen.
In addition to these ex officio boards, combination ex officio 
and appointive boards have increased from none in 1890 to twenty-nine 
in 1953. Strictly appointive boards Increased from two in 1890 to 
twenty-seven in 1953.^^
A compilation of all boards and offices in 1953 resulted in a 
total of 135. As Dr. Renne points out, *The state administrative 
machinery is far from a simple structure and the chief executive or 
governor of "üie state has a difficult job working out a smoothly func­
tioning and well coordinated administration."^7
These boards and commissions have grown with the state; as new 
functions were added by the legislature new agencies were erected to 
deal with them. Little attention seems to have been paid to the idea 
of incorporating additional functions into existing units of adminis­
tration. Nineteen separate boards are engaged in examining and licensing
^^David Smith, An Outline of the Development and Growth of State 
Administration in Montana 1890-1953 (unpublished research paper, Library, 
Montana State University), Table No. 1.
l̂ Ibid.
^^Roland R. Renne, The Government and Administration of Montana 
American Commonwealth Series, ed. W. Brooks Graves (New York; Thomas
I. Crowell Company, 1958), p. 89.
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individuals for various vocations and p r o f e s s i o n s .IS Financial duties 
are carried on by six boards and one commission, included here are the 
State Depository Board, the State Board of Equalization, the State Board 
of Examiners, the State Board of Supplies, the State Insurance Commis­
sion, and the State Furnishing B o a r d .^9
Twenty-three boards and commissions or councils are engaged in 
public health and welfare activities. There are twenty-one boards and 
commissions participating in various ways in the education of the people 
of Montana. Some twenty boards and commissions are engaged in activities 
relating to the development and control of natural resources of Montana. 
In addition there are some eight other boards and commissions covering 
such diverse activities as athletics and aeronautics.^®
Most of these boards and commissions are made up of citizens who 
are not salaried state officials. Many of the boards and commissions 
have only three members but range in membership as high as fifteen.^^
A rather large share of the governor's time is required in attempting 
to fill these positions on the many boards and agencies. In 1890 the 
governor appointed thirty-eight people to staff his administrationj due 
to the prevalence of the board and commission concept of administration 
in Montana, the governor, in 1953# had to select personnel for 287 
positions.
l^Ibid.. p. 106. 
19ibid.. pp. 108-109. 
ZOlbid.
^^Ibid.. pp. 105-106. 
^^Smith, p. 2.
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The Reorganization MovamAnt 
Other states also found growth to be a problem. Administrative 
machinery to deal with new activities increased with each legislative 
session. Perhaps one of the most striking illustrations of this growth 
in state activities is shown in terms of expenditures. In 1913 the 
total cost of operating all the states amounted to only $378 million. 
State expenditures in 1955, however, were nearly $16 billion.23
Accompanying this growth was a feeling that perhaps the new 
services were not being administered economically or efficiently. This 
feeling began rather early in the twentieth century and has continued 
to the present. As state services and the facilities for their admin­
istration increased, people began to express a new interest in the study 
of governmental organization:
In the early 1900 *s a group of man centering around the newly 
organized Bureau of Municipal Research in New York City had begun 
to feel goverment was sufficiently similar everywhere (at least 
in the United States) to nermit certain generalizations about the goals of administration.24
A movement for reorganization began in 1909* The Peoples Power
League of Oregon published a proposal in 1909 and again in 1910 for
reorganizing the executive branch of that state, concentrating the
executive power in the governor.
On January 5, 1910, Governor Charles £. Hughes of New York
^^Harold F. Alderfer, American Local Government and Administra­
tion (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1956), p. 171.
2^The Council of State Governments, Reorganizing State Govern­
ment (Chicago, 1950), p. 2.
23a. £. Buck, The Reorganization of State Governments in the
United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p. 6.
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suggested a solution to the problem of administration in his wrmngi 
message to the state legislature.
It would be an Improvement, I believe, in state administration if 
the executive responsibility were centered in the governor who 
should appoint a cabinet of administrative heads accountable to 
him and charged with the duties now imposed upon elected officials.
In 1911 President Taft*s Commission on Economy and Efficiency 
was established to study administrative reorganization at the national 
level. The Taft commission (though not particularly successful in 
attaining reorganization at the federal level) did advance the idea that 
problems of administrative organization could be studied in a systematic 
fashion. This was Immediately appealing to the states.27
New York was one of the first to study its administrative system 
and maiqr new recommendations were included in a series of proposed 
constitutional revisions which were defeated at the polls in 1915. 
Massachusetts and New Jersey also set up commissions for studying execu­
tive functions.
By 1917 there had been extensive reorganization studies conducted 
in fifteen states, and Illinois, under Governor Frank 0. Lowden, adopted 
an extensive statuatory reorganization plan.2^ Fifteen states had 
adopted reorganization measures by 1925. The movement continued through 
the 1920's and 1930's and at the beginning of World War II approximately 
thirty states had effected substantial r e o r g a n i z a t i o n .29
26cited in Buck, pp. 6-7.
27nie Council of State Governments, p. 2.
^^Buck, p. 7.
29willbern, p. 113.
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Since the Second World War the results of reorganization attempts 
have been very modest. By 1953 there had been postwar studies in twenty- 
four states; however, legislative adoption of the reccxmendations was 
limited.^°
With some exceptions and qualifications the general temper of the 
reorganization proposals and plans in all the states was to emphasize 
the.governor's responsibilities and attempt to give him authority com­
mensurate with those responsibilities.
Montana has had no extensive reorganization along these lines. 
However, there has been, from time to time, a feeling that perhaps the 
plural executive, commission type of administration was not the proper 
kind of administrative organization for the state. Joseph M. Dixon, who 
became governor in 1921, expressed this attitude rather candidly as 
early as 1919s
It is my opinion that in order to strike at the root of the present 
difficulty in the way of coordinating the various branches of the 
state government that a constitutional amendment is necessary.
The governor of the state, as the responsible executive, should 
have the right to name the purely administrative Z!sic7 state 
officers, in exactly the same way as the president names his 
responsible cabinet.
Good government comes from placing full responsibility in the hands 
of the fewest administrative officers possible and then holding 
the appointing power responsible for their individual actions. To 
my mind it is not possible to have effective government, as long 
as responsibility is scattered throughout a dozen different heads, 
each of whom has equal power in the matter of determining policy.
Our present administrative state government is a veritable patch­
work of pieced-on boards, with overlapping duties and responsi­
bilities . . .  .21
30lbid.. p. 113.
2lLetter from Joseph M. Dixon to Frank Eliel, June 11, 1919, 
Collected Papers, Montana State and Territory, Efficiency and Trade 
Commission, 1919, Montana State University Library, microfilm.
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This feeling led to the establishment, in 1919, of the State Efficiency 
and Trade Commission. This commission had two primary functions, First, 
it was to study the government of Montana and make recommendations 
which would promote efficiency and econoiqy. The second function had to 
do with an investigation of commercial activities in the state.
A second major study of Montana's governmental system was started 
in 1941. The legislature created the Governor's Committee on Reorgani­
zation and Economy and authorized the governor, with the aid of a 
citizen advisory committee and a consulting firm, to make a comprehen­
sive study of the entire organization and structure of Montana govern­
ment. This committee was allocated $20,000 and employed Griffenhagen 
and Associates, a professional governmental consulting organization, to 
conduct the study. The extensive study made by this group resulted in 
a voluminous report published in 1943.
In 1951 the Commission on Reorganization of the State Government 
of the State of Montana was established. This commission was composed 
of state legislators. The commission was delegated authority to make 
recommendations for reorganizing Montana government. In cooperation 
with the Montana Taxpayers Association, the commission employed an 
executive director to conduct its study. In 1953 the commission sub­
mitted its report to the legislative assembly.
The Model
It is the purpose of this thesis to analyze these three major 
reorganization studies conducted in Montana with regard to their con­
formity with, or departure from, the generally accepted principles of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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administrative organization for state government,In order to system­
atically analyze the work of the three studies, it is necessary to con­
struct a model administrative organization based upon these accepted 
principles.The model here proposed is based upon what A. E. Buck 
calls the "integrated type of administrative organization" as opposed 
to the present Montana system or the "conmission or plural executive 
type.
The executive branch of government is responsible for administer­
ing the functions performed by the governmentj it should be organized 
to perform its duty effectively and efficiently and it should be politi­
cally responsible for the performance of that duty. To achieve this 
objective it is necessary to have a short ballot, that is, elect only 
two officials from the same party to the executive branch, a governor 
and lieutenant governor, and place the power to direct in one of thenn- 
the governor. When the authority for the performance of executive 
functions is diffused among several elected officials, administrative 
conflicts result. Conflict is likely when these elected officials are 
members of different political parties.
The history of Montana is crowded with cases of political division 
in the executive department. In the eighteen elections held between 
1889 and 1956, the seven elected officials of the state have been of
^^illbern, p. 114.
^^This model is based primarily on the principles embodied in 
Chapters I and II of Beorganizinsf State Government. Council of State 
Governments, o p . cit.. pp. 1-67.
^^Buck, p. 29.
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the same party affiliation only seven t i m e s , I n  1956, for example, 
the governor and superintendent of public instruction were Republicans} 
the other five elected officials were Democrats. In the eleven elections 
in which there was a political division, the governor has been in a 
minority seven timesPolitical division may have significant conse- , 
quences for administration if the elected officials jointly constitute 
an important administrative board.
The Montana Board of Examiners made up of the governor, secretary
of state, and the attorney general has extensive financial control over
state activities; it has been said that the board; "... in reality
constitutes a triple-headed executive system."^ Political division on
this board may result in great difficulty for the governor to maintain
any control over the policies of the board. The fact that all the menH
bers of the board presumably have the mandate of the people encourages
them to act somewhat independently even when political unity obtains.
In connection with this specific board Leslie Lipson has written:
. . .  This board has great power and holds frequent meetings. A 
former attorney general of the state told the writer that the 
governor by no means rules the board. The triumverate indulges _ 
in * trading' and 'logrolling, ' and the governor may be overruled.*̂
A short ballot would eliminate this diffused type of adminis­
trative mechanism. The short ballot is not without precedent. In 
addition to the federal government, several states also use this system.
^^Compiled from Renne, p. 112.
^^Compiled from Renne, p. 112.
37lbid.. p. 113.
^^Llpson, pp. 36-37.
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In New Jersey, for example, the governor is the only publicly elected 
member of the administrative branch of the state.^9 Alaska also has a
short ballot, the only elected officials in the executive branch are the 
governor and the secretary of state,40
Another and integral part of the model is the idea of departmental 
consolidation. This plan involves the consolidation of all administra­
tive agencies into a small number of departments organized by function. 
The purpose of functional integration is to eliminate overlapping, 
duplication, and to define the authority and scope of the directing 
head. A large number of unrelated agencies making up the administrative 
structure leads to divided responsibility.
In addition to the grouping of agencies into departments on a 
uni-functional basis, the heads of all departments should be appointed 
by, and responsible to, the governor. Department heads should be 
appointed on the basis of their integrity and ability. In order to 
insure their responsibility to the governor they should serve at his 
pleasure. The governor's power of appointment and removal tends to 
identify those responsible for the action or inaction in the administra­
tion. 4^
Another and important part of the model concerns the elimination 
of boards and commissions for purely administrative tasks. Multi-headed
^^Bennett M. Rich, The Government and Administration of New 
Jersey. American Commonwealths Series, ed. V.Brooke Graves (Newïorkî 
Thomas I. Crowell Company, 1957), p. 85.
4Qrhe Constitution of Alaska Adopted February 5, 1956 (Fairbanks, 
AlaskaÎ Commercial Printing Co.), pp. 13-14»
4^Buck, p. 17,
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agencies divide responsibility and contribute to indecision. Single 
administrators should direct the operative affairs of an administrative 
agency.
Where citizen interest is great or where a council of mindm is 
felt necessary, advisory boards can be erected. However, advisory 
boards should in no way be allowed authority or responsibility for the 
actual direction of operations. If an agency performs functions pri­
marily of a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial nature, a plural­
headed agency should be Instituted. This type of administrative body 
should be integrated as closely as possible into the executive branch 
and should be appointed by the governor,
Another important tenet of this model administrative organization 
is to complement the governor *s powers with the authority to require 
reports and investigate administrative activities.
Accompanying the above mentioned control functions, the governor 
should have the necessary staff instruments. The governor should have 
an adequate personal office staff, including adequate clerical help, 
advisors, and administrative assistants.
The appointed department heads should be organized in a governor's 
cabinet. Collective discussion of the problems confronting all the 
agencies would promote better coordination of the state's administra­
tive apparatus.
A central budgeting agency with the authority to prepare an 
executive budget should be included in the governor's staff group.
Another fiscal agency required is a central accounting office 
to set up the accounting system for the state. It should also allot
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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appropriations, settle claims, and make a pre-audit of a U  expenditures. 
This office also should be responsible to the governor.
Central purchasing is an additional staff service that the 
governor should have. This office should obtain and distribute supplies 
for various state activities. Quantity purchasing on a bid basis 
reduce the item cost of supplies used commonly in state agencies,
A central personnel office with a sound merit system should be 
linked to the governor's office. Stressing the principles of civil 
service at the federal level, this agency should attempt to recruit and 
retain qualified personnel for the entire state administration.
The final agency attendant to the governor's staff contingent 
is a planning agency. This staff unit should be instituted to research 
and evaluate state programs with regard to coordination, trends, and 
possible future administrative needs.
The final part of the model is designed to provide the legisla­
ture with a tool for surveillance over the executive branch. A means 
for control over the fiscal operations of the executive department can 
be provided for by the establishment of an independent auditor. This 
auditor should have the authority to require of the executive branch all 
information needed to conduct a post-audit of the state's expenditures. 
This officer would be entirely responsible to legislature— not to the 
governor.
The governor and his subordinates must be responsible and account­
able to the people and the legislature for the conduct of the executive 
branch. However, as the Hoover Commission found in investigating the 
executive branch of the federal government in 1949:
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Responsibility and accountability are impossible without authority_
the power to direct. The exercise of authority is impossible without 
a clear line of responsibility and accountability frcm the bottom 
to the top. The wise exercise of authority is impossible without 
the aids which staff institutions can provide to assemble facts 
and recommendations upon the execution of decisions.^
The state governments of New Jersey and Alaska approximate the 
structure of this model. Alaska is perhaps closer than New Jersey. In 
Alaska the executive appoints the heads of a small number of departments 
(according to the constitution, the number of departments shall never 
exceed twenty); the department heads are responsible to the governor and 
serve at his pleasure. In addition, the constitution provides that 
operating agencies be organized by function into major purpose depart­
ments.^^
In summary, the model plan contains these principles:
1. Shorten the ballot and place the power to direct the state 
administration in a single executive officer— the governor.
In this way both the responsibility and authority for action 
are centered and identifiable.
2. Consolidate administrative agencies into a small number of 
departnents, organized by function, to prevent overlapping 
and duplication of services.
3. The heads of these uni-functional departments should be 
appointed by the governor and should serve at his pleasure.
^The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the 
Government, General Management of the Executive Branch, a report to 
Congress, February, 194-9 (Washington, D. C.: Ü..S. Government Printing
Office, 1949), p. 1.
43Alaska, Constitution.
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4. Single heads should direct the affairs of administrative 
agencies. Boards and commissions should be eliminated from 
purely administrative tasks.
5. Staff services should be placed at the disposal and under 
the control of the governor. Included among these services 
are:
a) The authority of the governor to require reports.
b) Â personal office staff for the governor including 
adequate clerical help, advisors, and administrative 
assistants.
c) A governor *3 cabinet composed of the appointed depart­
ment heads.
d) A central budget agency to prepare an executive budget.
e) A central accounting agency to set up a uniform account­
ing system for the state. This agency should allot 
appropriations, settle claims, and make a pre-audit of 
all state expenditures.
f) A central purchasing agency should be established.
g) There should be a central personnel agency linked to 
the governor’s office, stressing the principles of civil 
service found at the federal level of government.
h) A planning agency should be instituted to engage in 
research and to evaluate administrative programs.
6. An independent post-audit of the state’s financial affairs 
should be conducted by an auditor responsible to the 
legislature.
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Some of these principles have been embraced by each of the three 
reorganization studies conducted in Montana. For various reasons, how­
ever, extensive changes along the lines suggested in the model have not 
been made in the executive-administrative system of Montana. In the 
succeeding chapters a survey of each of these reorganization groups and 
their work is undertaken. The principles embodied in the model will be 
applied to the proposals offered by these reorganization groups in order 
to determine each group *s conception of the executive-administrative 
branch of Montana government and how these conceptions differ from the 
generally accepted principles of admihistration.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II
THE STATE EFFICIENCY AND TRADE COMMISSION OF 1919
As the functions, equipment, and expenditures of state govern­
ment began to increase, questions were raised concerning the adequacy 
of Montana's performance. Consideration was given to the idea of study­
ing Montana's administrative facility to determine the presence or 
absence of a businesslike approach to the administration of state 
affairs* In 1919, the Sixteenth Legislative Assembly created the three 
member State Efficiency and Trade Commission. The three members of the 
Commission were Frank Eliel, the chairman, N. T. Lease, and W. 0, Fisk, 
This Commission was delegated the authority to study the administra­
tive structure of Montana government and offer recommendations for 
change in that structure to promote economy and efficiency. The other 
purpose of the Commission was to investigate commercial combinations 
allegedly engaged in fixing prices within the state.
The Conmission was charged with the responsibility of setting up 
a budget plan and preparing a budget for submission to the Seventeenth 
Legislative Assembly in 1921.^ The Board of Examiners was originally 
responsible for preparing the 1921 budget, but, lacking facilities and 
funds, the task was delegated to the Commission. The Commission 
employed Tanner, Gilman and Ellis, an accounting firm from Chicago, to 
construct a budget system and outline a plan for a uniform system of
Montana, Report of the State Efficiency and Trade Commission 
Rendered on November 1. 1919. to Governor S. V. Stewart, p. 59.
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accounting in the 8tate.^
In addition to the budget plan, Tanner and Gilman drew up organi­
zation charts showing the administrative structure of several states. 
These plans were designed to provide the Commission with a working 
knowledge of the various organization patterns then existing in other 
state governments.^
Supplementing the work of Tanner and Gilman, N. T. Lease, a 
member of the Commission, toured several states and inspected their 
respective administrative systems.^ In addition, the Commission members 
made a general survey of Montana's executive-administrative organiza­
tion* The Commission's recommendations were based upon the work of 
Tanner and Gilman, Lease, and the Commission survey.
Generally, the Commission was interested in centralizing state 
administration and reducing the amount of work required of each elected 
officer. After studying the activities of the several officers, offices, 
and boards, making up the administration of Montana, the Commission 
became aware of the decentralized character of the state's administra­
tive structure.
The Commission determined that the elected members of the execu­
tive department were subject to extensive and time-consuming membership 
on numerous boards and commissions* The governor, the Commission
^Minutes and Papers of Efficiency and Trade Commission, Col­
lected Papers, Montana State and Territory (Montana State University 
Library), microfilm.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.. Minutes of June 4, 1919.
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conclxidad, was excessively burdened by his required membership on twelve 
different boards and commissions. Because of his participation on 
these boards, the Commission felt that it was physically Impossible for 
the governor adequately to perform the other duties of his office.^
Discussing the office of attorney general, the Commission pointed 
out that the people of the state elected a person to this office on 
the basis of his legal ability, not on the basis of his abilities as 
an administrator. The duties of the office, encompassing membership 
on mazqr administrative boards and commissions, were primarily of an 
administrative nature. As a result of this analysis, the Commission 
recommended that the attorney general be relieved of his membership 
upon these boards and concern himself with the legal aspects of his 
office.^ The Commission did not, however, draft a bill to implement 
this recommendation as it would have entailed extensive constitutional 
revision.
In connection with the analysis of the elected officials of the 
executive department, the Commission also studied the activities of 
the many state administrative boards. The Commission believed that 
there were too many agencies erected to deal with increased state 
activities. They felt that consolidation of agencies into departments 
would be of great benefit to the administrative organization of the 
state :
A new office or bureau is frequently created to perform a function 
closely related to the work already being done by an existing
^Report, pp. 4-5. 
^Ibid.. p. 5.
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office or bureau, and instead of creating a new office or bureau, 
the Legislature should have provided for the necessary extension 
of power of an existing office.'
The Commission recommended that six boards having to do with agricultural 
activities be consolidated into a department of agriculture under a 
single head appointed by the governor.® Also, the Commission recommended 
that the Industrial Accident Board, the Bureau of Labor and Industry, 
and The Bo^d of Arbitration and Conciliation be combined into a Depart­
ment of Labor. In the case of these proposed departments, no constitu­
tional limitation was evident and the Commission drafted bills to con­
solidate these agencies.9
The Commission, commending the idea of consolidation, was 
impressed with the cabinet plan of government recently adopted in 
Illinois. There, boards were consolidated into departments with single 
heads appointed by the governor and coordinated in a governor's cabinet. 
However, the Commission believed that the adoption of this system by 
Montana was impractical on two grounds. First, the Commission con­
cluded that the cabinet form of government, though well established in 
the business world, had not been tested for sufficient time in state 
government to merit adoption in Montana. A second conclusion was that 
the inauguration of the cabinet system in Montana government would 
involve extensive amendment to the constitution. The obstacles created 
by the existence of constitutional boards, commissions, and officers
7Ibid.. p. 53. 
®Ibid.. p. 112. 
^Ibid.. p. 161.
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were considered by the Commission to be insuperable.^^ Underlying both 
reasons was a general reluctance to eliminate any of the elected offices 
or to institute any "spectacular or revolutionary changes.
Intensive attention was, of course, given to the important 
Montana State Board of Examiners. The Board of Examiners was (and is) 
responsible for much of the state's financial administration. In 
addition to a monthly accounting of state funds the Board of Examiners 
had charge of planning and erecting buildings, purchasing all furnish­
ings for the state, awarding contracts, preparing a budget, and examin­
ing all claims against the state. The Commission discovered that the 
number of claims alone amounted to twelve or fourteen hundred a month. 
The volume of work falling upon this agency was too great, the Commis­
sion reasoned, for the members (the governor, attorney general, and 
secretary of state) to exercise proper control of the duties and perform, 
at the same time, the other activities connected with their respective 
elected offices.^
After thorough study the Commission came to the realization that 
the administration of Montana was less than adequate. They asserted 
that the administration was incapable of dealing effectively with 
increasing state activities. Boards or commissions, made up of elected 
and appointed officials, were not considered desirable for administra­
tive purposes. Speaking specifically of the Board of Examiners' role 
in state affairs, the Commission observed* "The manner of handling
^^Ibld., p. 52. 
l^Ibld., p. 51. 
^Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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the state's business was effective and satisfactory during the infancy 
of the state, but we believe that it is rapidly being outgrown.
On July 31, 1919, the Cœnmission presented a partial report of 
its investigations to the governor. (The reason for this incomplete 
report was the sudden convening of the extraordinary legislative session 
of 1919 to deal with the problems of drought in the state and to act 
on the woman's suffrage amendment to the Federal Constitution.) The 
primary proposal in this partial report was a recommendation for reform 
of the executive-administrative organization of the state. Essentially 
the Commission was concerned with centralizing the "business affairs" 
of the state. The Commission maintained that centralized control of 
the state administration would fix responsibility in fewer hands, allow 
the elected officials more time for their elected offices, and promote 
efficiency.
The proposal for centralizing state administration was based on 
the Commission's analysis of administrative reforms adopted in other 
states during the early 1900's. The Commission's proposed State Board 
of Administration represented a kind of synthesis of these reforms.
This plan consisted of a three-man board appointed by the governor. The 
board would take over the work of the Board of Examiners relating to 
the audit of claims, purchases, preparation of the budget, and control 
of the charitable, penal, and educational institutions of the state. ^
^3Ibid.. p. 162, 
^^Ibid.. p. AS. 
15Ibid.. p. A2.
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The creation of a Board of Administration was also an attempt 
to give fiscal control to the governor. Gubernatorial appointment of 
the board members would theoretically make the board responsible to the 
governor. Acquisition of the financial duties formerly performed by 
the Board of Examiners, and preparation of the budget would presumably 
place the Board of Administration in a powerful administrative position, 
subject only to the control of the chief executive.General control 
over state institutions and selection of the executive staff for these 
institutions would complete the administrative power of the Board.
The Commission attempted to achieve these reforms ty legisla­
tive enactment. A bill was included in the Report outlining, in 
detail, the powers of the contemplated Board. Conflicting statutory 
provisions for establishing such a board were eliminated in the draft 
of this extensive bill. The Commission, however, was ultimately forced 
to recommend a constitutional amendment to establish the Board of Admin­
istration. It is evident from the report that after submitting the bill 
for the creation of the Board, a question arose among legislators as 
to the power of the legislative assembly to establish such a board by 
mere statutory enactment. Because the new Board was to acquire many of 
the Board of Examiners' duties and powers, the legislature felt that it 
could only be established by constitutional amendment. The Commission 
was not willing to scuttle its proposal however:
So strongly do we favor the creation of such a Board of Administra­
tion and considerable controversy having arisen respecting the 
power of the Legislature to create such a board— whose duties
l^ibid.. p. 49.
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would necessarily conflict with the duties imposed by the present 
constitutional provision upon the Board of Examiners— that we 
decided to recommend the submission of the accompanying amendment 
• . . .In view of the controversy alluded to, we soon decided that 
the issue should be put squarely before the people whether such a 
needed administrative agency should be authorized.
The amendment, as submitted to the people of the state, gave the Legis­
lature power to establish a Board of Administration but the amendment 
specifically stated that the general supervisory power of examining 
claims would remain the province of the Board of Examiners. The Board 
of Administration would have the power to make purchases for the insti­
tutions of the state but no mention of other control functions over 
state institutions was made. This amendment, however, was defeated in 
the November election of 1920 by over 20,000 votes.
The general theme of the recommendations and accompanying argu­
ments offered by the Commission was centralization of the administrative 
affairs of the state. Coordination of administrative and fiscal activi­
ties would have undoubtedly been Improved under the proposed Board 
of Administration but “authority— the power to direct” would continue 
to be diffused. The reluctance to do away with the elected offices 
and their functions as administrative heads diluted the Board of Admin­
istration plan for centralization of administration. The responsibility 
for the conduct of the administrative affairs of the state would con­
tinue to be in the hands of the seven elected officials making up the 
executive department of the state.
'̂̂ Ibid,. pp. 161-162.
^%ontana. Secretary of State, Official Montana Election Returns. 
1920. Montana State University Library.
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Collaterally, the Commission recommendations included only 
statutory consolidation of a few of the many boards and bureaus con­
stituting the administrative machinery of the state. Due to the exis­
tence of formidable constitutional sanction for the commission form of 
administration in Monteuia, the Efficiency and Trade Commission was not 
prepared to recommend extensive departmental consolidation. According 
to the Commission, the concept of functionally integrated departments 
with single heads appointed by and responsible to the governor was a 
sound approach to administration. However the adoption of measures 
for consolidation and departmentalization and the erection of a gover­
nor's cabinet was considered too "spectacular."
The Commission did advocate in its plan the establishment of 
an executive budget; the budget was to be the responsibility of the 
proposed Baord of Administration. Central accounting was recommended 
by Tanner and Gilman, and incorporated into the Board of Administration 
proposal. Central purchasing was also recommended by the Commission. 
These staff functions were placed in the hands of the proposed Board.
A merit system for testing, selecting, training, and retaining
qualified personnel in the state employ was neglected in the Commission's
recommendations. The Commission seemed satisfied with the caliber and
19efficiency of the state's personnel.
Generally, the Board of Administration would have relieved the 
governor and the two other members of the Board of Examiners of many 
routine activities. The responsibility for the actions of the Board
^̂ Ibid.. p. 47.
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of Administration would fall to the governor because of his appointment 
of the Board members. Final authority of the Board’s fiscal activities, 
however, would be ultimately in the hands of the three member Board of 
Examiners. Control and supervision by the Board of Administration over 
state institutions was limited by the retention of the constitutional 
provisions relating to several boards among which are the Board of 
Examiners, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the State Board 
of Bducation.^^
Recommendation of a three member board shows the insistence on 
the concept of direction by a plural headed agency. Due to the overlap­
ping terms of the members of the proposed Board, the governor's control 
over this body would have been reduced. According to the Commission's 
report, the members of the Board would not necessarily be professional 
administrators; indeed, they recommended that two of the members be of 
the same political party. Such a stipulation in connection with the 
idea of a plural headed administrative body is a continuation of the 
checks and balances theory embodied in the concept of government by 
commission so prevalent in the nineteenth century,
A single responsible executive to direct the entire adminis­
trative apparatus of the state is central to the model plan. The 
Commission's initial departure from this concept was the proposal of 
an administrative board. Ultimate authority for fiscal management 
remained with the Board of Examiners by virtue of the original constitu­
tional provisions relating to that body. Control over the administrative
^Qjbid.. p. 103.
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agencies and bureaus could not be delegated to the Board of Administra­
tion due to the constitutional position of the elected executive offi­
cials and constitutional boards like the Board of Education. Consoli­
dation of agencies, though considered by the Commission to be theoreti­
cally desirable, was given up as an impossible task due to constitutional 
limitations. Also, the idea of citizen participation in administrative 
boards was a factor contributing to the Commission's reluctance to advo­
cate the elimination of plural headed agencies. The Commission was not 
prepared to advocate extensive amendment of the constitution to establish 
the cabinet system adopted by Illinois two years earlier. However, the 
Commission was willing to submit the Board proposal to the people. It 
was convinced that the Board of Administration would be an improvement 
over the existing administrative system, and at the same time would not 
depart radically from the multi-headed executive tradition prevalent in 
Montana.
The Commission's proposal for a Board of Administration was
entirely in keeping with their desire ". . .to recommend a conserva-
21tive plan" for Montana governmental administration. The plan was 
perhaps not "conservative" enough for the Montana voter of that era 
judging by its fate at the polls. Some possible explanations for the 
failure of the constitutional amendment will be offered in the last 
chapter.
2^Ibld., p. 48.
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CHAPTER III 
THE GRIFFENHAGEN STUDY
I"t was not until 1941 that Montana again approached the problem 
of the state's governmental organization. In that year, Governor Sam G. 
Ford recommended to the Legislature that a thorough study of the state 
administrative structure be made. The Legislature responded to this 
recommendation with little opposition and enacted Chapter 56 of the 1941 
Session Laws giving the governor power to appoint an advisory committee 
on Reorganization and Economy.^ Included in Chapter 56 was the express 
provision for making an exhaustive study to gather information which 
might lead to specific reconmendatlons relating to the improvement of 
the state administration and to governmental economies. In addition, 
the law gave the governor power to employ, with the advice of the advi­
sory committee, a professional firm; "skilled in the science of govern­
ment, to undertake the actual investigation of the state's finances, 
institutions, and general administrative facilities.
The Legislature appropriated $20,000 for the conduct of the study 
and the governor, with the consent of the advisory committee, employed 
Griffenhagen & Associates, a well known governmental consulting firm.
^The members of this committee were: W. E. Dowlin, Charles H.
Mahoney, Leonard Plank, Dry J. Armstrong, James N. Dougherty, Russell 
E. Smith, Fred Bennion.
Montana, Committee on Reorganization and Economy, Re organization 
Report Submitted to the Twenty-Eighth Legislative Assembly by Governor 
Sam C. Ford (Helena, January 1943), p. 1.
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This firm was selected on the basis of its experience in conducting 
reorganizational studies, and as organizational consultants in other 
state and local governments.^
Griffenhagen & Associates began their investigations on July 1, 
1941, and completed their voluminous report on March 1, 1942. The study 
conducted by the firm was thorough indeed; fifty-nine separate reports 
were prepared on the various facets of Montana's government; there 
were 1,415 typewritten pages in the cumulative report. In all, a total 
of 967 recommendations were made by the reorganization firm,^ Reccm- 
mendations made by the firm ranged from minor references concerning 
office procedures in the institutions, to major, and far-reaching pro­
posals for state-wide administrative reform. Some recommendations 
merely required an executive order for their Implementation; others 
would have required a great deal of legislation and even constitutional 
amendment.
In making the study, Griffenhagen & Associates would conduct 
the investigation of a given agency or function and submit their 
recommendations concerning that particular agency or function to the 
governor. The governor would then refer the recranmendations to the 
advisory committee. The advisory committee met with the official in 
charge of the agency or function and allowed him to participate in the 
discussion of the Griffenhagen report. Upon completion of the
^Ibld., p. 5»
^Ibid.. p. 5.
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discussions, the advisory committee in conference with the governor 
would discuss the report. The recommendations were then approved, 
amended or rejected by the committee. When a recommendation’was approved 
and where it did not require legislative action, the governor issued 
an executive order to implement the recommendation. Some recommenda­
tions were sent to the legislature for consideration and action after 
the war; most of these required legislation including additional appro­
priations, Recommendations requiring legislative action which were 
approved by the committee were transmitted to the governor who, in turn, 
submitted them to the legislature. Other recommendations did not receive 
approval by the committee and were not included in the report to the 
legislature; they were, however, accessible to the legislators in the 
state law library, along with the original and complete reports compiled
5by Griffenhagen & Associates.
The studies conducted by the reorganization staff were divided 
into three major divisions. The first division included the department 
or agency studies; activities, functions, and internal organization of 
all the units of Montana government were included in this study division. 
Operating policies, staff, expenditures, value and cost of the services 
were also object of analysis.
A second division had to do primarily with financial and staff 
surveys. The accounting system, budget construction and control, expendi­
ture and disbursements, debt administration, pre-audit, post-audit, and
5Ibid.. pp. 7-10.
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personnel policies and practices were considered in this division.
General state organization was the third division of study. This 
division (the most important for purposes of this study) was a broad 
survey of the allocation of functions and general administrative rela­
tionships existing in Montana's governmental organization. It is within 
the broad framework of this division that all the reorganization pro­
posals advanced by the firm have their basis.
Griffenhagen & Associates believed that the administrative 
structure of Montana needed to be reorganized. They were convinced 
that certain organizational principles were lacking in the executive- 
administrative structure of the state. In their general report several 
sweeping reforms of Montana's administrative system were advocated.
The advocacy of these reorganizational proposals was predicated on six 
general organizational principles: simple and definite organization,
integration, logical allocation of functions, suitable managing authori­
ties, continuity of operating policy, and competent personnel.^
In relation to the first principle— the need for simple and 
definite organization— the firm explained that there was a need for a 
clear and specific organizational plan. There should not be numerous 
agencies, branches and departments erected without reference to an over­
all plan. Each of the branches and agencies should be precisely defined 
and the responsibility for the direction of the agency should be clearly 
fixed. The firm concluded that Montana's organization was not clear 
and definitej it was complex, and responsibility for action was hard to
Montana, Griffenhagen & Associates, Report of the Governor's 
nmmmittee on Economy and Efficiency. General State Organizational Report 
No. 5S, pp. 10-13»
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determine. Because responsibility was difficult to determine in the 
various unconnected agencies, the study group found that the legislature 
was in the habit of delegating authority for action upon many questions 
to the Board of Examiners "under the guise of dealing with /their/ 
financial implications."
Montana, according to Griffenhagen & Associates, was definitely 
in need of the second principle— integration. Integration in the firm’s 
vocabulary meant the coordination of the state’s activities under a 
central executive authority. Included in the concept of integration was 
a provision for "facilities for promoting cooperative action among, and
gproviding common services to, the several departments." The firm con­
cluded. that the constitutional investment of the governor with "supreme 
executive power" was not an actual fact in Montana. The governor is 
excluded from the use of his power because of provisions in the law:
giving independent authority to boards, commissions, and other 
elective officers. Under such circumstances the governor is in 
no position to 'see that the laws are faithfully executed. ’
Public opinion holds him responsible, but as he does not have the 
authority necessary to enable him to carry out the responsibility 
placed upon him by public opinion, as well as by the express 
mandate of the constitution, he is placed in an Impossible posi­
tion.^
Allocating functions on a logical basis was another principle 
which the reorganization staff advocated. Basically this principle 
envisions the placing together of functions and activities which are 
either similar in character, subject matter, or in the type of personnel
*̂Ibid.« p. 10. 
% i d .. p. 11. 
^Ibid.. p. 11.
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performing the tasks. The firm found that similar functions were dif­
fused throughout the various agencies making up the administration of 
Montana. During their analysis the firm discovered several cases of 
duplication and overlapping operations
According to the Griffenhagen staff, a single administrator is 
the basic requirement involved in the principle of managing authorities. 
The management of most activities should be in the hands of a single 
directing officer. Such an administrator should have the authority to 
carry out his task and be provided with adequate counsel and staff aids. 
The firm recognized the possible necessity for using boards as policy 
agencies in certain circumstances but even in these cases they advocated 
a single administrator to implement the decisions of the board. Single 
executives employed in directing positions, with authority and respon­
sibility for the operation of governmental activities, was, according 
to the firm, the exception and not the rule in Montana government.
Boards and commissions tended to predominate as the instruments for 
administrative direction and supervision:
Entirely too many straight administrative and executive responsi­
bilities are assigned to boards. Boards in general are not well 
suited for executive action, and the least well adapted for this 
type of responsibility are ex officio boards where the members 
are engrossed in other dutie^̂  Yet many such boards have been 
given administrative duties.
This form of administration, of course, had its roots in the constitu­
tional framework of Montana.
Another principle advanced by Griffenhagen & Associates involved
lOlbld.. p. 12. 
^^Ibid.. p. 12.
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the idea of a continuing operating policy. Continuity of policy in the 
management of state affairs is primarily enforced through employment 
practices. Montana, the firm concluded, had a history of interest in 
continuity; continuity was provided, however, by the appointment of 
people to boards and commissions for overlapping terms. A principle 
advocated by the group having a collateral relationship with the prin­
ciple of continuity was the principle of recruiting and retaining com­
petent personnel. While finding no evidence of ", . . widespread 
incompetency among the state's employees. , the firm concluded that
there was no systematic approach to the problems of selecting qualified
12personnel and retaining competent employees.
When the firm's principles were applied to Montana the evidence
of divergency was abundant. The executive-administrative branch of
Montana government was found by Griffenhagen & Associates to violate
nearly all the principles.
The organization is such as to defy accurate charting that would 
truthfully show the relationships among the various agencies.
A basic reason for the diffused character of the state's administrative 
system was the Legislature's attempt to control administrative activi­
ties. In connection with the "supreme executive power" allocated to the 
governor by the constitution, the firm pointed out:
. . . the existing organization is so designed as to go far in 
nullifying rather than implementing this section of the consti­
tution. This situation results from various devices that have 
been used deliberately, in establishing agencies to carry on
l^Ibld.. p. 6. 
^^Ibid.. p. 6,
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administrative functions, to^eaken the governor’s influence over 
the agencies involved. . .
Primarily the devices used to weaken the governor’s control were the
establishment of boards for directing administration. Correspondingly,
there was a restriction of the governor's power to appoint responsible
single heads to direct the activities of the several governmental units,
The governor has complete authority for the appointment of members to
these boards in only about half the agencies over which these boards
preside. However, according to the reorganization staff, this power
does not insure control over the operation of a given agency:
This does not mean that he /the governoj^ can always exercise 
control because many of the boards are made up of members whose 
terms are longer than that of the governor, with only a fraction 
of the membership up for appointment at any one time,^
Another abridgement of the principles outlined by the firm regarded 
the composition of membership upon these boards.
According to the provisions establishing many of the boards in 
Montana, membership upon the boards must be drawn from the areas of the 
economy or society served by the boards. The governor in many cases 
must appoint people engaged as private citizens in the activity con­
trolled by the board. Griffenhagen & Associates considered this incon­
sistent with good government:
Such provisions overlook the principle that if the state govern­
ment is to conform to the high ideals upon which the state consti­
tution is predicated, the purpose of government regulation and 
government activity in general must be the protection and improve­
ment of the welfare of the citizenry as a whole.
^Ibid.. p. 7. 
^^Ibid«. p. 8. 
^^Ibid.. p. 26.
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The staff found that there were at least fifteen boards where one or
17more members were selected in this fashion.
Another type of administrative device with which the firm took 
exception was the ex officio board. Montana, in keeping with the idea 
of internal checks and balances in the executive branch, has made exten­
sive use of this type board for administrative purposes. The popularly 
elected members of Montana's executive department are required to sit on 
these boards to supervise the operation of certain state activities.
The purpose of this kind of administrative or executive unit is to elimi­
nate the possibility of total authority accruing to one individual.
These ex officio duties are an addition to the duties imposed upon the 
officers in connection with the respective constitutional offices for 
which they were elected. Regarding the ex officio activities of these 
elected officers, the reorganization staff concluded that these offi­
cials s
, , , are selected for particular jobs. Under any sound plan of 
organization they should be fully occupied with such jobs. The 
diversion of their time and energies to other frequently unrelated 
matters can only result in that much neglect of the basic respon­
sibilities of their cæiginal positions. The duties now assigned 
to ex officio boards should be assigned directly to the agency 
with which their activities gge associated most closely, and the 
boards should be eliminated.
As pointed out above, ex officio boards were inconsistent with the firm's 
idea of good administration^ boards are inferior to single administra­
tors and ex officio boards are least effective for purposes of directing 
19activities.
^^ibid,. p, 7. 
l^ibld,. p. 21,
^%upra. p. 6.
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The Reorganization Plans
To implement reform in Montana government along the lines sug­
gested by these principles would have involved extensive constitutional 
amendment. The analysis of Montana’s administrative * system indicated 
the need for extensive reform according to the firm. However, the 
practical obstacles to a sweeping reorganization were apparent to the 
firm’s staff. Therefore, Griffenhagen & Associates prepared two plans 
based upon their analysis of Montana's organization. The first pimn 
was called a ’proposed” or "long range” plan, and the second a "modi­
fied” or "immediate” plan.
The "long range” plan was based almost entirely on the principles 
of state administration enumerated by the firm. The structure of this 
long range plan was simple and precise; responsibility was fixed and 
authority centered. The governor would be the single elected executive 
officer and would preside over seventeen departments making up the admin­
istrative service. The direction of each department would be the task 
of a single administrator appointed by, and responsible to, the gover­
nor.^®
A governor’s or “executive cabinet" would be instituted and the 
directing officers of the departments would comprise the membership of 
this cabinet. Because certain activities of government are of a quasi­
legislative or quasi-judicial nature, the firm agreed that some of the 
departments should have a board to deliberate appeals from persons 
affected by certain of these activities. Six such boards were included
^®General State Organization Report No, 58, p. 23.
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in the long range plan. Agencies would be structured in the depart­
ments on a functional basis. The primary function of the plan would be 
to place the governor in the position of chief executive as formally 
expressed in the constitution.^^
The first plan was not presented with any hope of adoption. An 
awareness of the constitutional and political impediments to such a 
plan prevented the firm from submitting it as the only proposal for 
reform of Montana’s governmental system.
The first plan /the long range plaj^ . . . would be desirable to 
adopt if it were possible to ignore all the constitutional and 
other difficulties in the way. It is intended for use only as a 
guide for future legislation and for constitutional amendments 
needed to clear the way, step by step, for its ultimate adoption. 
There are too many obstacles to permit its immediate adoption.
The long range plan was not adopted ty the advisory committee in
any case. It was transmitted to the Legislature without recommendation
for action. In the final report to the Legislature, the plan occupies
23only one page in the 132 page report.
Generally, the long range plan is in conformity with the model 
plan contained in Chapter One,^^ Based upon the principles formulated 
Ty the Griffenhagen firm, the first plan embodies the idea of responsi­
bility commensurate with authority. The vertical arrangement of the 
organization would insure clear lines of authority from the bottom to 
the top and from top to the bottom of the administrative structure. At
^^Ibid.. p. 30.
22ibid.
^ n̂oTTiTTiittee Report, pp. 118-119.
24supra. Chapter One, p. 15.
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the top of the structure, the governor, as the only elected executive 
official, would become the real chief executive. Appointment and removal 
power over the department heads would place the authority and responsi­
bility for administrative policy and action (or inaction) in the gover­
nor's hands.
Departments, in the long range plan, were to be comprised of 
agencies placed in these departments on a unifunctional basis. The 
number of administrative units, according to the plan, would be sub­
stantially reduced as a result of integration into departments. As 
mentioned above, the board or commission concept of administration would 
have been effectively eliminated by the institution of single adminis­
trators to head departments and agencies. Boards would be retained in 
advisory capacities with the final decision for action resting with a 
single administrative officer. Quasi-judicial functions and quasi­
legislative activities would be assigned to boards but the administra­
tion of board decisions would be carried out through a single adminis­
trator.
To insure an adequate staff for the chief executive the long 
range plan incorporated a governor's cabinet comprised of the appointed 
department heads. This provision corresponds to the model. Other staff 
aids including a provision for a personnel agency were advocated by the 
firm. This, also, is in keeping with the model. Central budgeting, 
another staff function, was included in the plan as was a provision 
for a central accounting organization. Furnishings and ceptral purchas­
ing were to be included in the executive branch under administrators 
responsible to the governor.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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A post-audit of the state's expenditures by a legislative post- 
auditor was also advocated in the plan and conforms specifically to the 
model. Perhaps the only provision not included in the long range pign 
which does appear in the model is a provision for a planning agency as 
part of the governor's staff contingent.
As conceived, the long range plan would have implemented the 
principles expressed by Griffenhagen & Associates and would, with minor 
exceptions, conform closely to the model. Indeed, the administrative 
principles advanced by Griffenhagen are in direct conformity with the 
model. Some differences as to number of departments or in names «wd 
place of an integrated agency within the structure might occur among 
advocates of this model concept, but, generally, the firm's principles 
and the principles embodied in the model are not divergent.
The Modified Plan
Because the long range plan was considered Impractical a second 
plan was introduced. The second or modified plan presented by the 
Griffenhagen people was an attempt to improve the administration of 
Montana within the framework of the constitution. As much of the basic 
plan as could be enacted by statute was retained in the modified plan. 
The elected members of the executive department and the powerful Board 
of Examiners were continued in this plan. The modified plan included 
twenty departments, seven appointed boards and seven ex officio boards. 
While the modified plan retained all the constitutional boards, offices, 
mnH agencies, it did reduce the total number of administrative units in
^^Renne, p. 116.
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the state administration from 136 to 53. This lower figure was 
achieved primarily by consolidating several functions, similar in nature, 
into single departments.
The modified plan retained the executive cabinet proposal found 
in the long range plan. In some cases the constitutional provisions 
for boards necessitated the utilization of these boards as the directing 
authority for a department instead of the more acceptable single head. 
Where a board presided over the department, the executive officer of 
the board would be a member of the cabinet. The purpose of the cabinet 
would be to acquaint the various department heads with the over-all 
functions of the state primarily with regard to fiscal matters The 
erection of a cabinet and the use of integrated departments with some 
single heads appointed by the governor was intended to place the governor 
in a position of greater control over the executive branch. Within 
Montana's constitutional limitations this plan attempted to give the 
governor authority more nearly commensurate with his responsibility.
Montana's elected executive officials were utilized for adminis­
trative purposes in the modified plan. A department of law was created, 
the functions of which would be the same as those performed by the 
attorney general's office. According to the Griffenhagen firm, several 
state agencies were hiring their own legal counsel. The new department 
of law would handle all the legal work for every part of the state 
government and the practice of hiring additional legal staff by agencies
^%eport No. 5Ô, p. 8.
27jbld., p. 36.
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would be abolished. In the long run the firm advocated the abolition 
of the attorney general as an elected office. This was in keeping with 
the principles embodied in the long range plan.
Another elected officer, the state auditor, was placed in the 
modified plan as a post-auditor. The auditor is, according to the con­
stitution, a member of the executive department, Griffenhagen & Associ­
ates stated that the office properly belonged in the legislative branch, 
performing the function of an independent post-audit of the state's 
expenditures. However, due to the constitutional provisions placing 
the auditor in the executive branch, the firm retained the position but 
altered the function. The purpose of the auditor in the modified plan 
was to conduct a post-audit of the state and submit it to a proposed 
legislative audit committee. These duties would require the absorption 
by the auditor of functions previously handled by the state accountant 
and the state examiner. In addition, the auditor would, under the plan, 
be relieved of all ex officio duties and membership on all ex officio 
boards where possible without constitutional amendment,
A department of state, headed by the secretary of state, was 
recommended in the modified plan. The duties of this department were 
primarily the same as those usually performed by the secretary of state's 
office. These functions are related to the keeping of the state records, 
preparing voting tabulations and other matters relating to elections.
In the view of the reorganization staff, the office was of such a nature 
that the policy of selecting the secretary of state by election was 
without merit.
Aside from the duties imposed upon the boards of which he is a 
member, the duties of the secretary of state are largely of a
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ministerial character. They involve little discretionary power 
and almost no responsibility for important matters of state policy. 
Election is an expensive and inefficient method of selection of 
administrative officers . . .  it is recommended that the constitu­
tion be amended to provide for filling the office by appointment 
of the governor.
Included in the departmental concept of the modified plan was a 
department of the treasury headed by Montana's elected treasurer. Pri­
marily, the duties of the department were a continuation of the former 
duties performed by the office of the treasurer with the addition of 
some responsibilities in the area of investments. This additional 
function was designed to center the investment activity in one state 
office rather than continue the dispersal of various investment pro­
cedures among several agencies. In addition, the constitutional Board 
of Examiners would reside in the proposed department of the treasury 
and would constitute a board of finance. However, the reorganization 
staff advocated the abolition of the Board of Examiners as soon as possi­
ble. The firm also recommended the elimination of the elective office
of treasurer, ultimately transferring the department of treasury func-
29tions to a department of revenue under the control of the governor.
Another fiscal department, a department of finance, would deal 
with the general management of Montana's finances including: budget
preparation, pre-audit personnel administration, purchasing, and account­
ing. Agencies which had formerly performed these functions would be 
transferred and integrated in the finance department. The department 
would be headed by a single administrator appointed by the governor,
28%bid.. p. 39.
^^Ibid.. p. 43.
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however, constitutional authority for the performance of all these 
functions had to be provided for by including the Board of Examiners in 
the department. Here, also, the firm continued to urge the eventual 
abolition of the Board of Examiners,
The modified plan as outlined in the final report was an attempt 
to consolidate the many administrative functions of the state into a 
logical pattern of departments within the constitutional framework.
This was to be affected by integrating agencies into departments under 
single heads where possible and by creating an executive cabinet. The 
cabinet was an attempt to provide greater authority and control by the 
governor over the state’s administrative system. However, the retention 
of constitutional boards and elected officers of the executive branch 
departed from the idea of concentrated authority and responsibility.
The modified plan was the offspring of expediency and reflected the for­
midable constitutional and political obstacles to any reform of Montana 
government. Discussing the problems of reorganization, Griffenhagen & 
Associates observed:
Necessarily, any change can be expected to meet with some opposi­
tion because there are always those who are so reluctant to give up 
anything to which they are accustomed for anything unfamiliar to 
their experience that they will simply not go into the merits of 
what is proposed. This type of ’blind’ opposition often can be 
met only by a stronger force,
The modified plan also departs from the model described here in 
Chapter One, Retention of the elected administrative officers; dispersal 
of authority for administrative action among several boards and
30lbid,. pp. 43-46. 
31lbid.. p. 14.
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commissionsj and fiscal control by the three members of the elected 
executive are all examples of the departure of the modified plan from 
the model.
Departmentalization based upon functional integration is in keep­
ing with the model, but in the modified plan authority for directing is 
placed in the hands of a board or commission; thus, the principle of 
single heads with authority and responsibility for action is absent.
In the case of those proposed departments where an elected officer is 
the head, responsibility to the governor is absent. Coordination of 
policy would rest upon the willingness of these independent elected 
officials to follow policy recommendations made by the governor.
Fiscal control in the modified plan is vested (as in the consti­
tution) in the independent, elected officers comprising the Board of 
Examiners. Post-audit of the expenditures of the government would be 
conducted by the state auditor. But the auditor, being an elected 
official, would not necessarily be responsible to the Legislature. In 
addition, authority for the conduct of a post-audit would not be entirely 
in the hands of the auditor unless a constitutional amendment was passed,
allowing the auditor to exercise some of the accounting duties consti-
32tutionally allocated to the state examiner and the state accountant."̂
The proposed staff aids in the modified plan are similar to those 
in the model. A budget division in the department of finance and a 
division of personnel administration conform in principle to the model. 
However, because the Board of Examiners is the executive head of the
^^Ibld.. p. 35.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
proposed finance department, authority and responsibility for the fiscal
operations of the state would be subject to possible compromise among
the members of this multi-headed executive body. Retention of the Board
of Examiners is definitely inconsistent with the model plan; authority
and subsequent direction would rest on a collective decision. Collective
responsibility would also be imposed. The Griffenhagen staff was well
aware of this situation when they wrote:
It has been clearly demonstrated and is generally conceded that 
administrative functions cannot in the average case be exercised 
with continuing effectiveness by boards. Action on countless 
details, involving innumerable personal contacts and immediate 
decisions, rather than group Judgment, is called for in the exercise 
of such functions. Doubts as to authority to act, unwillingness 
to assume responsibility, the need for consultation, explanation, 
and compromise— all these— slow up action. . .
Such a situation, coupled often with a diverse political complexion, 
makes the Board of Examiners, as an instrument of administering staff 
and fiscal functions, particularly divergent from the model.
The long range plan, as mentioned, was not recommended to the 
Legislature for adoption. Included in the modified plan were several 
recommendations extracted from the long range plan, but these recommenda­
tions were offered as goals for future amendment and legislation. A 
long and detailed bill was drafted encompassing the recommendations 
offered in the modified plan. The bill, however, was defeated in tlB 
Legislature in 19A3«
Generally, the principles enunciated by the Griffenhagen people 
correspond to current administrative theory. Movements within other 
states have resulted in the adoption of similar proposals. Several
^^Ibid.. p. 18.
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factors contributed to the failure in Montana of even the modified 
version of the Griffenhagen plan. The study conducted by the firm was 
too detailed; the fundamental problems and the proposed solutions to 
these problems were obscured by the firm's emphasis on minutiae. Per­
haps the temporal aspect of the study also contributed to its failure. 
Proposals to expand the authority of the executive branch, offered 
during a time when the world was engaged in an armed conflict over 
totalitarianism, were not destined for a rational discussion. Political 
factors were responsible in large part for the failure of the proposals; 
they will be discussed in the concluding chapter.
The evidence of diffused authority and responsibility found by 
the firm was abundant. The reasons for this diffusion were clearly and 
accurately described by the firm. Most of these problems remain extant 
in Montana today, though subsequent efforts on a more limited scale have 
been made to rectify them. It is to one of these more recent efforts 
that we now turn.
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THE COMMISSION ON REORGANIZATION
In 1951, another commission of major importance, the Commission
on Reorganization of State Government of the State of Montana, was
created to survey the entire structure of state organization. The
members of the Commission were all legislators (differing in this
respect from the advisory committee in the 19-41 study).^ Not only
was the composition of the Commission legislative in character, but the
responsibility of the Commission was to the Legislature and not the 
2governor. The political complexion of the group was bi-partisan with 
an equal number of members from each political party on the Commission. 
Supplementary task force committees composed of citizens outside the 
Legislature, and members of the Commission, did most of the actual
3survey work.
The Commission was charged with the task of making a complete
study of the organization and structure of Montana government. The
Commission was authorized:
. . .  to review and analyze the various activities, functions, 
departments and boards of the state government and reccmmend the
1The members of this Commission were: Glenn H, Larson, chairman,
E. F. McQuitty, vice chairman, Donovan Worden, H. A. Tibbals, Winfield 
£. Page, John J. MacDonald, William R. Mackay, and Melvin E. Magnuson, 
secretary.
^Montana, The Commission on Reorganization of State Government 
of the State of Montana Report to the Thirty-Third Legislative Assembly 
(January, 1953), p. iv. !
^Ibid.. p. iv.
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consolidation, reorganization or abolishment of those not deemed 
essential to the welfare of the people of the state.^
Armed with this rather broad grant, the Commission began its work.
One of the initial acts of the Commission was to employ an execu­
tive director to head and coordinate the work of the Commission and task 
force committees. The Montana Taxpayer's Association offered the ser­
vices of a member of its staff, Frederick Gillette, as executive dir­
ector. Mr, Gillette's salary was to be paid half by the Taxpayer's 
Association, and half from Commission funds; this arrangement was 
accepted and Gillette was retained.^
Of primary concern to the Committee was the organization of the 
executive-administrative branch of Montana. In the meetings of the 
Commission several of the problems inherent in the general structure 
of the state's administration were discussed. The governor, the various 
agencies, their growth in number and complexity, and the important 
State Board of Examiners were objects of extensive deliberation. The 
Commission had no particular plan or set of principles to guide it in 
its study of the executive organization. Because no broad principles 
were formulated, the Commission relied on the feelings expressed by 
the membership and upon testimony of citizens and officials interested 
in the organization of the executive-administrative branch.
^Ibid.. p. iv.
^Note: This unusual salary arrangement was prompted by expedi­
ency. The Montana Taxpayer's Association was interested in the Com­
mission's work, particularly any aspect of it that would result in 
economies in government. It was due to this interest that the Associa­
tion offered the services of Gillette. The Commission accepted this 
offer primarily on economic grounds. Conversation with Winfield 2. 
Page, September 3, I960, Missoula, Montana.
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Generally, the question with which the Commission was dealing 
had to do with the location of authority and responsibility for the 
administration of state activities. This question ultimately led to a 
discussion of the merits of investing the governor with sole responsi­
bility and authority by consolidating operating and control agencies 
into departments headed by administrators appointed by, and responsible 
to, the governor. An alternate question logically followed regarding 
the merits of retaining the existing allocation of authority and respon­
sibility among the elected officials, the Board of Examiners, and other 
constitutional bodies. Testimony was taken from several people regard­
ing the organization of the executive branch. An invitation was sent 
to the members of the former advisory committee participating in the 
Griffenhagen study in 1943 to gain their assistance and advice on this 
matter. For various reasons these people were unable to attend.^
Many conflicting opinions were expressed by the members of the 
Commission and by witnesses; some supported, in varying degrees, 
retention of the constitutional form of organization; others r̂ecommended 
a departure from the constitutional form. After hearing this testimony 
the Commission adopted an amended motion stating;
. . . That the Commission go on record as proposing to study the 
executive branch of state government with the view to reorganizing 
it along functional lines, using constitutional offices so far as 
possible.'
Montana, The Commission on Reorganization of State Government 
of the State of Montana, Minutes. November 15. 1951» Collected Papers, 
Montana State and Territory (Montana State University Library), Micro­
film.
’jbiâ-
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Mopting this approach, the Commission began considering proposals in 
a more restricted frame of reference.
One of the bodies of primary concern in the state »s organizational 
fabric was the powerful Board of Examiners. Because the Board was com­
posed of the governor and two other popularly elected members of the 
executive branch, some question of precise designation of authority and 
responsibility among the members was raised. A letter was received by 
the C(«mission from the clerk of the Board of Examiners, Mr. Fitzsimmons, 
He proposed a board of control appointed by the governor to replace the 
Board of Examiners. In an interview with Mr. Fitzsimmons, the Commission 
was given a general review of the work of the Board. Mr. Fitzsimmons 
pointed out that not all the Boards of Examiners in his experience 
(nearly thirty years) had been in harmony. Mr. Fitzsimmons suggested 
that his proposed board of control have responsibility not only for claim 
approval but be in charge of the custodial institutions as well. Some 
(Question as to the feasibility of such a radical change was voiced in 
the interview:
Mr. Larson asked if Mr. Fitzsimmons really believed that a con­
stitutional amendment abolishing the Board of Examiners, as pre­
sently constituted, stood much chance of passage. Mr. Fitzsimmons 
said he didn't know the answer to that. He said it was amazing how 
few people in Montana knew what the State Board of Examiners was.
He said people, when he tells them he works for the State Board 
of Examiners,-will ask him if he doesn't mean the State Board of 
Equalization.
Mr. Fitzsimmons indicated that in his opinion such an amendment, if made 
"bj the Commission, stood a stronger chance of passage than at any other
Minutes. January 16, 1952.
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9time.
Â member of the Commission who supported, in part, the proposal
to abolish the Board of Examiners said that he felt there would be little
opposition from the elected members of the Board. His reasoning was
that abolition of the Board would allow them more time to conduct the
affairs of their respective elected offices. In this, Mr. Fitzsimmons
did not entirely concur:
Mr. Fitzsimmons said while that was true in part, it still should 
be remembered that there is a matter of prestige and power involved, 
and that no official within his experience has ever been happy to 
relinquish his prestige and power.^
The proposals to abolish the Board of Examiners and to make the governor 
the chief executive in fact, evidently gained some support in the Com­
mission. In June of 1952, consideration was still being given by the 
Commission to the proposal though they had previously agreed to the idea 
of retaining the constitutional structure as far as possible.
In a conference with Governor John Bonner the Commission outlined 
a proposal for the elimination of the Board of Examiners. Generally, 
this discussion centered on three main points. The first of these 
related to the abolishment of the Board of Examiners and placing its 
authority in the governor. A second point involved the appointment of 
a board responsible to the governor to handle the administrative tasks 
formerly carried on by the Board of Examiners. The third point involved
^Notes This statement was perhaps made regarding the strictly 
legislative composition of the Commission. It was felt that a group 
composed entirely of legislators would receive better treatment at the 
hand* of legislature than one appointed by the governor.
^°Ibid.
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the erection of staff facilities for the governor. Governor Bonner's 
reaction to these proposals was;
• . . that he concurred in them fully. He said under the present 
arrangement with the splitting of responsibility /fo^ the state's 
affairs between the chief executive and the attorney general, and 
the secretary of state, it was a wonder that the state government 
held together as well as it did,^^
In subsequent meetings of the Commission support was voiced for this plan
but division among the members as to the theory of executive power became
increasingly evident.^ Opinions from former state officials indicated
that transfer of the powers of the Board of Examiners to the governor
would not be in the interests of the state:
Mr. Gillette then reported to the Commission the views of Governor 
Ford and Associate Justice Bottomly, who were governor and attorney 
general respectively during most of the 1940's. Their view was 
that the judgment of three men on matters of important state policy 
is better than the judgment of one man. Neither of them would 
favor the elimination of the Board of Examiners.^^
The feeling among the members toward the theory of executive power 
began to solidify around retention of the constitutional form. Some of 
the duties which had accrued to the Board of Examiners were considered 
to be primarily the responsibility of the governor. However, a sweep­
ing proposal for the transfer of the duties was not acceptable even to 
those Commission members who felt the Board of Examiners organization 
inconsistent with good administration.
Mr, McQuitty said he had long ago come to the opinion that the 
people of the state in voting for an attorney general and a secretary
^^Minutes, June 19» 1952.
^Minutes. August 28, 1952 and Minutes. October 14, 1952. 
^^Minutes. October 17, 1952.
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of state do not vote for those officers on the basis that such 
officers are going to be the state's top executives, but they 
voted for them on the basis of qualifications for the job of 
attorney general, and the job of Mcretary of state. He said 
a change would be a far-reacting /sic/ thing, and that he did not 
believe as a result of the work of this Commission, that'we were 
in a position to go to the Legislature and propose it because we 
did not have a sufficiently well-developed plan to serve as an 
alternative.
Contained within the Commission's final report to the Legislature 
were a few recommendations transferring from the Board of Examiners to 
the governor minor statutory powers concerning automobile usage and 
allocation of money between budget classifications within departments.
Some very significant legislation was drafted proposing the
transfer of extensive power from the Board of Examiners to the governor
in the areas of contract awarding, printing, and supply purchase:
Generally, the State Board of Examiners have had the general super­
vision, direction and control of the subject matter of . . . con­
tracts for supplies, printing, furnishing of the legislative 
assembly with furniture and letting of contracts for public build­
ings and improvements. The proposed legislation will transfer 
these contracting powers to the governor with the controller as 
his administrative agent for the purpose of performing a U  of the 
acts required and fully advising the governor of the need, the 
costs and aiqr other particulars with regard^to the accepting of 
bids and letting of contracts for the same.
However, this "proposed" legislation was not included in the Commission 
report and was never introduced on the floor of the Legislature. The 
members of the Commission changed their minds and it was dropped. The 
reason for this collective change of mind lies in the expressed reluc­
tance of the new governor, Hugo Aronson, to see the introduction of
14ibid.
^^Letter from Frederick Gillette, executive director of the 
Commission, to Fred Martin, executive secretary of the governor, Helena, 
Montana, January 23, 1953.
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such legislation. This reluctance was born of the governor's fear that 
a proposed transfer of these powers from the Board of Examiners would 
alienate the other two members of the board— the attorney general and 
secretary of state— and cause friction in his future associations with 
them on the board.
In the final report to the legislative assembly the Commission 
expressed its belief that the governor should have authority commensurate 
with his constitutional responsibility. They felt that in Montana the 
power to direct the state administration had been diffused in several 
ways*
. . .  (1) failure to give the governor general powers of direction 
and supervision over state administration. (2) Corollary to this 
has been the granting of powers to a multi-headed executive— the 
State Board of Examiners. The governor bears public responsibility 
for the administration of legislative policies in the eyes of the 
j^blic and yet he has not been given the authority, . , . The other 
two members of the State Board of Examiners— the attorney general 
and secretary of state— have little if aî r responsibility in the 
public mind for administration of state affairs, but nonetheless 
possess the management authority, . .
However, as pointed out above, the recommended transfer of power from 
the Board of Examiners to the governor was not introduced in the legis­
lative assembly. Therefore, the Goimnission's analysis of misallocation 
of authority and responsibility was not supplemented by the introduction 
of corrective legislation. The Commission also felt that the growth
of state agencies and the character of boards and commissions contributed
13to a lack of executive supervision.
^^Interview with Winfield Page, former member of the Commission, 
Missoula, Montana, August 2, I960.
'̂̂Report. p. 2.
IBlbid.. p. 3.
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Commission proposals for reform of the several administrative 
agencies in Montana were based on two major conclusions. In the first 
place, the Commission felt that there were a number of boards which 
were no longer of any value to the state, or that the functions of a 
number of boards could be transferred to other agencies. The Commission 
recommended the abolishment of thirteen boards and transfer of any 
remaining active functions to some other a g e n c y . second conclu­
sion was related to the board or commission structure of many agencies 
in Montana, Many members felt that the commission form of government 
was acceptable:
In general, however, the commission tradition is very strong in 
Montana government. This strength grows from the sound ground of 
citizen interest, and citizen willingness to participate in state 
government. Some commission members bring years of experience and 
judgment to their tasks, qualities which no single administrator, 
however qualified or zealous, could match,
However, the Commission reasoned that in order to identify responsibility 
for board decisions, and to give the governor some control over these 
boards, the appointment of board members should be for the same period 
as the governor’s term of office. Overlapping terms, they felt, made 
the governor an heir to the previous administration’s appointees. There­
fore, the Commission advocated four year terms for members of boards 
qrif̂ that composition of boards should be of a bi—partisan character with 
a preponderance of the board membership being from the party of the 
governor,This affected a compromise; on the one hand, the commission
^^Ibid., p. 9. 
^^Ibid,. p. 5* 
21ibid,, pp« 5—6.
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tradition could be preserved, and at the same time the governor's con­
trol would be assured. Apparently the Commission favored the retention 
of a board member selection process in which the governor was required 
to select members from the economic category served by the board.
In a meeting with Dr. John Sly, Chairman of the Department of 
State and Local Government at Princeton University, the problem created 
ty the existence of a large number of licensing and examining boards 
was discussed:
Dr. Sly said, 'don’t try to consolidate them and wipe them off the 
organizational chart.' %  said, 'you will have every dentist,
every doctor, every accountant, every plumber, every Tseautician, 
every barber, and every food distributor landing right square on 
the legislature's neck if you start that.'^^
This counsel evidently prevailed because the Commission's only recommend­
ation regarding this subject of examining boards was that some future 
council or legislative committee "undertake a thorough study of the 
various licensing and examining boards.
The Commission was aware of the lack of coordination among the 
large number of agencies in Montana government and sought a plan which 
would minimize this condition,To improve coordination and restrict 
the possible occurrence of overlapping and duplication, the Commission 
proposed three inter-departmental advisory councils. These councils 
were to function in the areas of health and welfare, natural resource 
development, and agriculture and livestock. Erection of them was aimed
^%inutes. April lA, 1952.
^^Report. p. 9.
^^Ibid.. p. 5.
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at providing the inatitutional equipment for a "teamwork approach" to 
problems common in all three areas.Such a plan was a of cabinet 
institution below the level of the chief executive. In the subsequent 
legislative session, legislation was passed erecting these councils.
Possible staff assistance for the governor was also considered 
by the Commission. From their studies, the Commission concluded that 
there was an urgent need for a personnel system in the state. A merit 
system was in operation in Montana, but this system covered only state 
employees working in agencies in which both federal and state funds 
were being expended. The federal government required these agencies to 
adopt a merit program, but the major portion of state employees were 
under no personnel system. The Commission recommended the creation of 
an agency to administer personnel, set up position classifications, and 
establish pay scales. The proposed agency was to have a commission of 
four members appointed by the governor for four year terms and an 
executive director appointed by the commission was to direct the activi­
ties of the agency. This recommendation was subsequently enacted into
/ There was a great deal of discussion over the important staff 
function of budget preparation. In 1951, a law was passed removing the
^^Ibid.. p. 7.
2%otes The personnel commission operated between 1953 and 1955 < 
However, opposition in the Legislature to the commission’s choice of 
commission director and opposition by state officials to the personnel 
plan submitted by the commission resulted in its destruction. The 1955 
Legislature refused to appropriate funds for the commission's continu­
ance; the law creating the commission remains on the statute books but 
the commission is, at present, inoperative.
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power to prepare a budget from the Board of Examiners and placing the 
responsibility with the state controller, an appointee of the governor* 
However, the controller is not necessarily responsible to the governor 
as his term of appointment is for eight years. Thus, it was possible 
for a new governor to inherit the previous administration's budget 
director. The Commission discussed the desirability of transferring 
responsibility for budget preparation to the chief executive since the 
overlapping term of the controller might effectively eliminate the gover­
nor's control over the budget. ' In the meeting with Dr. Sly, this situa­
tion was deliberated:
It was pointed out that the power of the budget making has, through 
enactment of the Comptroller Law /sic/, been removed from the hands 
of the executive and placed in the hands of an official who is 
strictly neither legislative or executive. Dr. Sly's comment was 
that it is better to adhere to the constitutional divisions of 
power, as between the executive and legislative and Judicial. He 
said that departures from long established forms are certain to 
lead to eventual trouble. He said in long run, the state will be 
better off with an executive budget prepared by the governor. . . .
Dr. Sly said that it is a mistake to let subordinate officers 
determine fiscal policy • . * officers, such as the comptroller 
/sic^ who are outside the traditional framework of government, do 
not have the responsibility to the people upon which the determina­
tion of fiscal policy must rest.^^
However, the proposals of the Commission relating to the budget in the
final report did not transfer the budget functions to the governor but
rather added new functions to the controller in his continuing role as
the chief officer in budget matters.
'̂̂ Minutes. April L4, 1952.
^%enort. pp. 24.-27. Note: The controller law was repealed in
1959, and responsibility for budget preparation was transferred to the 
governor.
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The Analysis
Generally, the Commission on Reorganization indicated in its 
final report that the governor's office was entirely too weak. In the 
early meetings of the Commission there was evidence of a genuine desire 
to strengthen the office, never, however, to the point of eliminating 
aiQT of the elected executive officials. The subsequent recommendations 
indicated a change in the Commission's thinking.
The possible elimination of the Board of Examiners was never 
strongly considered, and the proposal to transfer some of the Board's 
important powers over purchasing and contract functions was not intro­
duced into the Legislature for consideration. Thus, the Commission, 
though considering various proposals for making the governor's authority 
commensurate'with his responsibility, made no concerted legislative 
effort in that direction. The authority for directing the adminis­
trative apparatus continued to be diffused among the members of the 
elected executive department. The Commission recommendations did little 
to discourage or ameliorate this situation and thus are not in conform­
ity with the model plan mentioned in Chapter One.
Another and similar departure from the model plan also resulted 
from the Commission's decision to retain the constitutional framework 
of the state. Consolidation of administrative agencies into single 
headed departments responsible to the governor was not advocated by the 
Commission. Some integration of the functions of dormant boards into 
existing agencies was recommended, but no extensive departmental con­
solidation resulted. In order to achieve some semblance of control by 
the governor over these departments the Commission advocated that the
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boards governing them be comprised of members, the majority of whom were 
from the governor's party. In addition, all board members were to serve 
only during the governor's incumbency. Single headed departments were 
not considered feasible or desirable by the Commission; adherence to the 
board and commission concept of government prevailed in the recommenda­
tions made by the Commission— this is also a direct departure from the 
model.
The Commission attempted to overcome problems of agency and 
department coordination by proposing interdepartmental advisory councils. 
These councils were subsequently established by the Legislature but are 
considerably short of the governor's cabinet proposed for this purpose 
in the model. In fact, the governor was excluded from participation 
on these inter-departmental councils because it was feared he would 
dominate them.^9 Thus, the professed (.asire for greater authority for 
the governor was circumscribed. Extensive proposals for consolidation 
were considered politically unpalatable; one of the task forces engaged 
in studying the possibility of consolidations reported:
. . . that any change such as that embodied in the Griffenhagen 
Report No. 58 would meet and involve considerable opposition . .
Tgtpand-fng the personal staff of the governor was at one time 
proposed by the Comnission. Governor Bonner endorsed this proposal. 
However, no legislation on the subject was introduced.
The budget function was retained under the controller; indeed, 
additional duties of a budgetary nature were assigned to the controller
^^Minutes. August 28, 1952. 
^^Inutes. June 8, 1951-
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and effective supervision by the governor was not implemented. This is 
a substantial departure from the model which advocates that the governor 
have the authority and responsibility for preparing a budget.
Accounting also came in for consideration. As existing consti­
tutional provisions prevented a complete central accounting system, 
the Commission recommended that, where possible, the accounting system 
should be centralized under the controller. Included in the Commission's 
conception of a central accounting system was a provision that the post­
audit function also be carried out by the controller. This officer, 
because of his eight year appointment, was not necessarily responsible 
to the governor who served only a four year term. It could not be said 
that the controller was responsible to the Legislature because of his 
appointment by the governor. As pointed out by Dr. Sly, the controller's 
office was independent of either branch. Therefore, the recommendation 
that the controller perform the post-audit departs from the model 
because the office is not responsible to the legislature.
One proposal made by the Commission was in direct conformity 
with the model. Prompted by the desire to insure an effective force of 
state employees and eliminate costly personnel turnover in the state, 
the Commission recommended creation of a personnel commission. The later 
controversy over the appointment of the director and the plan submitted 
by this commission ultimately eliminated any desirable effects the 
commission might have had.
Generally, the recommendations which the reorganization Commission 
drafted and submitted to the legislature were adopted. It should be 
noted, however, that those recommendations which were adopted were
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generally technical in character. Organizational changes affected by 
the Commission were slight due primarily to the determination to retain 
the original constitutional structure.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
By initiating the three studies of Montana's governmental organi­
zation, the legislature indicated an awareness that certain organiza­
tional problems existed and all three of the studies confirmed the 
existence of these problems. Surveying the basis upon which each group 
made its recommendations, a parallel becomes apparent. It is evident 
that all three studies were dealing with problems having a common origin. 
Generally, the problems with which they were dealing emanated from the 
constitutional structure of the executive-administrative branch.
In the early 1900's the multi-headed executive system may have 
been adequate but, as the services performed by the state increased in 
number and complexity, a corresponding growth in organizational apparatus 
was inevitable. State expenditures record this growth,rather dramati­
cally. Total state expenditures in 1920 were only |7,883,531.43.^
Twenty years later, total expenditures had grown five times the amount
2of the 1920 figure. In 1958, the total state expenditure exceeded 
#153,000,000. Between 1921 and 1958 there was an increase in Montana 
expenditures of over 1800$.^ Administration became vast and complex
^Montana, 1921 Legislative Budget of the State of Montana, p. xxv.
^Figures compiled from the 19Z1 Legislative Budget of the State 
of Montana, p. l6.
^Figures compiled from the 1959 Legislative Budget of the State 
of Montana, p. 96.
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to handle the functions implicit in this expansion of Montana’s fiscal 
outlay.
As the number of administrative units began to grow, responsi­
bility for making decisions affecting these units became obscure. Two 
factors contributed to this obscurity: first, the constitutional
division of executive power among the seven elected officials and the 
various boards upon which they sat prevented any direct line of authority 
running from the top directly to the bottom of the administrative system. 
A second factor contributing to the lack of responsibility lay primarily 
in the character of the growing administrative system. Single adminis­
trators with the authority and responsibility for directing the opera­
tion of a given administrative unit were not employed. In their stead, 
the legislature in setting up new administrative units applied the 
traditional board or commission as the decision making head. The mem­
bers of these commissions were appointed by the governor but usually did 
not serve at his pleasure and often served terms longer than the appoint­
ing governor. Responsibility to the governor as the chief executive was 
abbreviated. Isolated pockets of authority grew up and consequently 
diffused responsibility became institutionalized.
Important executive tasks allocated by the legislature and the 
constitution to the Board of Examiners exemplify the structured diffusion 
of authority and responsibility. Executive functions commonly handled 
by the chief executive at the national level of government are performed 
in Montana by three popularly elected, state executive officials, having 
equal voting power on Board decisions. Popular election makes the 
attorney general and the secretary of state independent of the governor;
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frequent political party difference among the members compounds the 
effects of this independent status. The number of important executive 
functions performed by this board has increased. The legislature, in 
an attempt to center responsibility without giving up the traditional 
aversion to concentration of authority, has chosen the Board of Examin­
ers as the depository of extensive executive power. The Board presently 
administers forty-one different sections of Montana law. Placing power 
in the hands of the Board does not, however, center authority and 
responsibility for action— It perpetuates diffusion.
Properly, the function of the chief executive in state government 
should be performed by the governor. Departments headed by officers 
responsible to the governor should carry out the administrative policies 
of the governor. Checks and balances between the three branches of 
government— legislative, executive, and judicial— has proven to be a 
sound approach to a dynamic but controlled government. However, the 
ideological ancestors of checks and balances, Montesquieu, Locke, and 
Jefferson, did not conscience the theory of checks and balances within 
each branch of the governmental system. In Montana, the election of 
several executive officials, and the creation of administrative boards 
with these officials acting in ex officio capacities has, in fact, 
created a system of checks and balances internal to the executive branch.
Thus, the execution of laws has devolved to a group of officials 
who may, by virtue of being popularly elected, act independently of each 
other in the administration of the law. When these independently 
elected officials are joined together on a board to make decisions con­
cerning administrative policy, ccmpromise becomes inevitable. As a
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consequence of this situation, the governor, as chief executive possess­
ing supreme executive power, is something of a fiction. The deficiencies 
of a weak chief executive are compounded as the scope of administration 
increases in response to the felt needs of the people in Montana.
The Approaches
In Montana, the three major reorganization groups sought, in 
various ways, to obviate the problem of diffused authority and responsi­
bility in an expanding administrative apparatus. The 1919 Efficiency 
and Trade Commission made an attempt to center the powers of the execu­
tive in the governor. This was to be accomplished by the erection of 
a board of administration appointed by the governor to handle many of 
the duties formerly performed by the Board of Examiners. This plan 
would have placed the governor in a somewhat more responsible position. 
However, the maintenance of the commission type of administrative 
system with elected officials continuing to head important administra­
tive areas would have frustrated much of what the Board of Administra­
tion plan was aimed at achieving. Because the Commission was disin­
clined to recommend constitutional amendments eliminating the Board of 
Examiners, the multi-headed administrative boards, and the elected 
executive officers, actual centralization of authority in the governor 
would have been very limited. There is a certain irony surrounding this 
Commission's proposals. Though the Commission was reluctant to propose 
constitutional amendments to secure a centralized administrative system, 
ultimately even the limited plan had to be put before the people in 
the form of an amendment.
The second major study performed between 1941 and 1943 by the
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Griffenhagen people resulted, as explained, in two plans. The first 
or basic plan would have involved an extensive alternation of Montana's 
executive-administrative system. This plan corresponds almost pre­
cisely to the model plan. Its adoption would have resulted in the elim­
ination of six of the seven elected executive officers ; only the governor 
would have been retained. Under this plan, departmental consolidation 
with single administrators responsible to the governor would have 
effectively eliminated the present confusion surrounding responsibility
iand the line of authority in the state's administration. These pro­
posals implied a complete revision of the sections in the Montana Con­
stitution relating to the executive branch. The citizen advisory com­
mittee did not, however, recommend this plan to the legislature. A 
modified version of the plan, less sweeping in character, was recom­
mended.
This second or modified plan retained all the constitutional 
officers and institutions. Generally, the modified plan aimed at 
reducing the number of administrative units and at placing similar func­
tions in unifunctional departments, headed by the elected state offi­
cials. Within the scope of this plan were reforms directed at strength­
ening the governor as the chief executive. Proposals for transferring 
statutory duties from the Board of Examiners to the governor, eliminating 
boards aufj commissions from purely administrative tasks, conferring upon 
the governor the responsibility for preparing a budget, attempting to 
centralize the accounting functions of the state and attempting to 
establish at least a limited legislative post-audit were all designed to 
center executive functions in the chief executive without altering the
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Montana Constitution.
The proposais offered by the Commission on Reorganization in 
1953 were somewhat more limited than those of the two earlier studies. 
Some of the reasons for the less sweeping character of the Commission 
recommendations have already been given. Included in the minutes and 
the report of this Commission is conclusive evidence that the problems 
in the state's administrative structure were the result of diffused 
authority and responsibility. The limited efforts toward reorganization 
made by the 1953 Commission were in the direction of ameliorating these 
problems. However, the insistence of retention of boards and commis­
sions as administrators continued to retard actual, effective, control 
by the governor. The creation of the inter-departmental advisory 
councils was designed to improve the coordination among units of the 
government discharging functions similar in nature. Proposals for 
over-all coordination vere neglected. No recommendation was made for 
actual functional integration of agencies into departments with depart­
ment heads comprising a coordinated governor's cabinet. Members of the 
Commission expressed an awareness of the problems and a desire to see 
the traditional structural deficiencies corrected. But, the Commission, 
for a variety of reasons, did not propose effective reforms to eliminate 
the problems which some of its members clearly recognized.
The Opposition and Its Effects
Both the destiny and character of the proposals presented by 
these groups were affected hy the opposition to reorganization in 
Montana government. Opposition to changes in the structure of Montana 
government can be roughly divided into three classifications. First,
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there is opposition l̂ y the affected members of any reorganization scheme. 
These people are both administrative officials and elected officials 
whose duties, span of control, and general influence may be decreased. 
Administrators are reluctant to give up any activity or personnel which, 
through the years, they have acquired. This is not merely the operation 
of an administrative ego; many administrators genuinely feel that the 
activity which they are performing cannot be properly handled by ai^ 
other agency or combination of agencies. They may be in favor of reor­
ganization of the state government, but they consider their particular 
activity to be, in a word, different. This response usually issued 
from the fact that individual administrators fail to comprehend the 
administrative system in its totality.
Opposition from elected officials has at least three manifesta­
tions. If reorganization reduces the areas of activity of an elected 
official, his political prestige suffers. In addition, the official may 
also feel that he is performing the tasks of his office adequately and 
attempts to remove duties from him are a reflection on his abilities.
If reorganization proposes the abolition of an elected office, these 
two aspects of opposition are intensified. Added to them will be the 
realization that elimination of the office destroys a possible political 
stepping stone toward other state or national offices.
A second classification of opposition comes from outside the 
government. Interest groups of all kinds have, over a period of time, 
established access to the government by a n^iad of institutional and 
personal contacts. Shifting or reorganizing the government may dry up 
or alter these channels of access; services formerly performed by
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friends and veil known agencies may, after reorganization, be handled 
by a new organization and perhaps different officials. The rapport 
which the interest group has created may be altered or destroyed entirely. 
Effctrts toward reallocating duties, responsibilities, and functions 
through reorganization may be resolutely opposed by these interest 
groups.
A third classification embraces both inter-governmental and extra- 
governmental opposition. It is generally conceded that people are reluc­
tant to dispose of patterns of activity to which they have became accus­
tomed. In administrative terminology this is called inertia to change. 
Perhaps quantitatively this is the most formidable area of opposition. 
Several factors contribute to inertia to change. There is a tendency 
to resist a break with tradition, due in part to the general social 
sanction given things traditional, and in part from reluctance to permit 
disturbances of existing relationships. Insufficient information con­
cerning the need for change also contributes to the lack of support for 
reorganization. Very little has been done in the way of explaining, 
on a state-wide basis, the problems in Montana's executive-administra­
tive system. If the citizenry is unaware of the institutional impedi­
ments to proper administration, they will not enthusiastically support 
proposals for reform. Indeed, the response to reform will be negative 
because the inertia to change phenomenon is extant.
The general character of the proposals submitted by the 1919 
committee were affected by the committee's appraisal of the opposition. 
Any substantial effort to alter the constitution and achieve centrali­
zation of administration was considered impossible by the committee.
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The major reform that the committee did propose vas defeated at the 
polls. This defeat stemmed from several interrelated factors. The 
sudden convening of an extraordinary session of the Legislature did not 
allow the Commission time to publicize its reform proposals. The people 
of the state were confronted with a constitutional amendment, the 
reasoning behind which had not been thoroughly explained. There was no 
movement of apy significance at the grass roots to support the reform 
proposals. Thus, opposition to the proposals was the only force actively 
operating.
The proposals of the Committee on Reorganization and Economy in 
1943 were affected by the opposition forces. Both the advisory committee 
and the Griffenhagen firm were aware of the potentially strong opposi­
tion to the sweeping character of the first plan. Because of this 
opposition the basic plan was altered; the resultant modified version 
was subsequently recommended by the committee. A member of the committee 
reflecting on this procedure pointed out:
I believe that the committee of which I was a member made a mistake 
in trying to judge the politics involved and in trying to compromise 
so that the committee proposals would be generally accepted«4
However, even the compromise plan failed in the Legislature. Fundamen­
tally the failure stemmed from the fact that the only group actively 
advocating reform was the advisory committee. There was no effective 
organization, either in the Legislature or at the grass roots, attempt­
ing to achieve enactment of the reform measures. The opposition had a 
rather free hand as Smith pointed out:
^Letter from Russell E. Smith (a member of the advisory committee) 
to F. B. Gillette, October 18, 1951.
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. t . the head of every department involved will make vigorous 
objection to anything that involves his department . . . every 
elective officer will fight to the bitter end to preserve the pre­
rogatives of his office. The only way that a Committee on Reorgan­
ization can accomplish anything very substantial is to decide upon 
a course of action, and then carry their recommendations directly 
to the people so that the issues involved in reorganization are 
before the people and the legislators at the time of the election. 
Unless there is a demand that literally comes from the grass roots, 
reorganization bills will have very slight chance of passage because 
all the people involved will gang up on every proposal.'
The character of the recommendations submitted by the Commission 
on Reorganization in 1953 was affected by the Commission's analysis 
of the opposition. The Commission did not recommend any alteration in 
the basic executive-administrative structure. Members of the Commission 
were aware of the underlying problems in Montana's organization but 
attempted to avoid offering proposals which would have attracted an 
organized opposition. The failure of the Commission to submit its 
drafted proposals (transferring important executive powers from the Board 
of Examiners to the governor) indicates the respect that the Commission 
had for the opposition forces. Because the Commission's recommendations 
were generally limited in scope, their proposals had greater success 
on the floor of the legislature. However, even this Commission felt 
the impact of the opposition on what was perhaps their most significant 
recommendation— the personnel commission. Appointment of a personnel 
director repugnant to members of the legislature enabled a coalition 
of administrative officials opposed to the personnel commission to 
solidify legislative support for abolishing the commission. The legis­
lature destr<^ed the personnel commission by ultimately refusing to
5Ibid.
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6appropriate funds for its continuance.
If reorganization of Montana's executive-administrative system 
is considered desirable (and the creation of the three studies indicates 
that some support for reorganization exists), an active force for reform 
must be created. To achieve reorganization, education of the voters 
and the legislature is necessary. The people and the legislature must 
be appraised of the administrative problems existent in Montana. The 
merits of alternative administrative plans must be explained, and efforts 
made to show how a modern system could be applied in Montana government. 
There are several approaches to education of the citizen and the legis­
lator regarding the need for reform. The only effort presently being 
made is directed toward the Legislature. The Legislative Council, 
created in 1957, is attempting to study the problems of Montana govern­
ment including the problems of state administration. This group, 
composed of members of the Legislature, meets during the interim period 
between legislative sessions. It has a permanent research staff headed 
by an executive director. According to the executive director, reorgani­
zation proposals are offered by the research staff to the legislative 
members of the council. The members of the council then have a chance 
to survey the recommendation in light of the facts supplied by the staff. 
In this way, the council member has a chance to work out in his own 
mind the logic of the recommendation.̂
^Conversation with Winfield £. Page, a member of the 1953 Com­
mission and a legislator, August 2, I960.
7Conversation with Eugene C. Tidball, executive director of the 
Legislative Council, June 22, I960.
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Generally, the Legislative Council staff agrees with the adminis­
trative concepts embodied in the Council of State Government’s model 
administrative organization. The Montana Legislative Council, however, 
has never formulated and issued a statement of its goals concerning 
administrative organization. In 1959, the council proposed the transfer 
of the budget making powers from the controller to the governor and the 
legislature enacted this recommendation into law. Presently, the council 
is working on a proposal to transfer the claim approval function from 
the Board of Examiners to the governor.° Both of these proposals are 
steps in the direction of the model plan.
The approach of the Legislative Council is somewhat different 
than the procedure followed by the three major reorganization studies. 
Primarily, the council attempts reorganization in a piecemeal fashion. 
Statutory changes are recommended by the council and, through a 
Judicious use of the three constitutional amendments each legislative 
session, a step by step reorganization is envisioned along the lines 
of the model plan.
This approach, however, has serious shortcomings. No extensive 
effort to publicize the desired changes is made by the council. As a 
result, there is no auxiliary citizen movement to augment the council's 
attempts at reform. As pointed out in connection with the three reor­
ganization groups, this may be fatal to recommendations for reorgani­
zation. The council relies on its legislative members to clarify and 
support its proposals on the floor of the Legislative Assembly. These
^Ibid.
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efforts are not assisted by any citizen group appealing to the legisla­
tors as a whole for the enactment of reform legislation. On the other 
hand, the opposition elements actively work for the defeat of proposed 
reorganization legislation. Ultimately the success of the Legislative 
Council's efforts will rest upon the ability of the council members to 
convince the majority of the legislature of the need for reform. If 
they are not successful in this, and there is no supplementary movement 
from voter groups, the very existence of the council may be threatened. 
If the council proposes an amendment which substantially alters the 
executive-administrative structure of the state, the offended adminis­
trative and elected officials comprising the opposition may be able to 
solidify enough support in the legislature to have the council abolished 
or at least restrict its latitude.
Another approach to reorganization lies in the possibility of a 
constitutional convention. Revision of the constitution to implement 
modern administrative practices would require a thorough and widespread 
educational program. If such a program were undertaken by various 
citizen groups, there is a possibility that the climate for reorganiza­
tion might be affected. A constitutional convention was proposed in 
the 1959 Legislative Assembly but was defeated. Unless there was 
extensive and intensive preparation precedent to such a convention, the 
ultimate value would be questionable in any case.
The singularly important area where information concerning reor­
ganization has been neglected is at the citizen level. No political 
party has campaigned, in recent years, on a platform advocating reform 
of Montana's administrative system. Little activity among Montana
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citizen groupa has ever been undertaken regarding administrative reform. 
Until efforts are made in this direction, the opposition to reform will 
be able to perpetuate the nineteenth century administrative structure—  
they will win by default.
The model plan presented in this paper is derived from the plan 
advocated by the Council of State Governments.
This model is based upon the results of over four decades of 
administrative research both in government and in business. It provides 
what this writer considers to be the best framework for the logical and 
responsible exercise of executive functions in a modern state government.
Generally, the three reorganization commissions submitted pro­
posals to the legislature which were somewhat less sweeping than those 
embodied in the model plan. The first study aimed at centralizing state 
administration by giving certain powers to a board appointed by the 
governor. It did not propose consolidation of agencies into unifunc­
tional departments headed by administrators responsible to the governor. 
A planning agency, a personnel agency staff, and clerical assistance 
were also neglected in the plan.
The second study completed in 1943 consisted of two plans, the 
first of which was almost identical to the model. However, the second 
or modified plan which was ultimately submitted to the Legislature was 
quite different from the model. The basic reason for the divergence 
results from the decision to retain the elected executive officers as 
the directing heads of administrative departments.
The Report of the Commission on Reorganization in 1953 contained 
only one proposal which was in specific conformity with the model. This
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was the plan to create a personnel commission to improve the state's 
personnel policy.
In the administration of Montana government today only one aspect 
of the model plan is actually in operation. This is the executive 
budget instituted by the Legislative Council. Another feature of the 
model, the personnel commission, remains on the Montana statutes but 
is inactive.
The three reorganization studies conducted in Montana have 
poir.tei out the need for reorganizing the state executive-administra­
tive system, Efech study took a somewhat different approach to the prob- 
i.em but generally they concluded that the governor should be given 
authority more nearly commensurate with his responsibility. The feel­
ing that the executive branch of government should not continue to 
operate under the pall of divided authority and responsibility is grow­
ing among legislators. Efforts by the Legislative Council to explain 
the deficiencies inherent in the executive branch have contributed to 
the legislators'knowledge of the problems. A legislative subcommittee 
on governmental efficiency has recently approved the idea of a strong 
executive with single administrators heading the various state depart­
ments and serving at the pleasure of the governor.^ The state of Alaska 
has adopted a constitution embracing the model plan for the executive 
branch and the other states have administrative systems similar to the 
model.
State government today is charged with performing technically
^Ibld.. (conversation)
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intricate activities on a vast scale. The executive-administrative 
branch of government is properly responsible for the efficient and 
economical performance of these activities and modern organizational 
techniques provide the means whereby these functions can be undertaken. 
"Authority— the power to direct" is a necessity if the functions are 
to be efficiently performed and democratic government requires that the 
directing agent be responsible to the legislature and citizen for that 
performance. Institutional obscurities of authority and responsibility 
make it difficult for the citizen or the legislature effectively to 
evaluate the executive branch of government. Effective evaluation of 
those responsible for administrative policy and practice is required 
ijtt order that the citizen may intelligently execute his democratic 
franchise.
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